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Remembering James Nelson Goodsell
Don Bohning
Jim, as many of us dinosaurs, had groum increasingly 
concerned about the state of journalism and particularly 
foreign reporting in the modern age.J
im Goodsell, the long­
time Latin American cor­
respondent from the 
Christian Science Monitor 
had that great quality of 
being both a good 
reporter and a first-rate 
hum an being. I first m et 
Jim  in 1966 in the Dominican 
Republic in advance of that coun­
try’s first post-civil war elections. I 
last saw Jim  in mid-January 1996 
when we had lunch to kick around 
some agenda ideas for the 
Fourteenth Annual Journalists and 
Editors Workshop. He will be 
missed.
Jim, as many of us dinosaurs, had 
grown increasingly concerned about 
the state of journalism  and particu­
larly foreign reporting in the m od­
ern age. Despite the trem endous 
technological advances, in some 
ways, matters were much less com­
plex and more straightforward 30 
years or so ago. In that light, it 
m ight be more instructive attem pt­
ing to predict the shape of foreign 
coverage into the 21st century by 
taking a look backwards to see how 
far we have come in the past three 
decades.
Communications were horrible 30 
years ago. The main source of news 
into the newsroom was the teletype 
machine, roaring along at 60 words 
a minute. The same day New York 
Times was unavailable except for sto­
ries that moved on its wire service. 
Once the Sunday Times showed up 
in the newsroom on Tuesday. The 
one advantage was that you could
Don Bohning is a staff writer for the 
Miami Herald. He has been with the 
Herald for 36 years.
write the same story a week after the 
Times had it, and no Herald reader 
would know the difference. United 
Press International was still fighting 
the good fight with the Associated 
Press. Editing was literally a cut and 
paste job.
The Herald did not even have a 
telex m achine in the newsroom at 
that time. The only telex m achine 
in the building was in advertising on 
the second floor. A case was finally 
m ade for a newsroom telex after the 
shooting by the US Marines of my 
predecessor, A1 Burt, and a Herald 
photographer, Doug Kennedy, dur­
ing the 1965 Dominican Republic 
Civil War— an incident which hap­
pened 31 years ago.
Lee Winfrey, another Herald cor­
respondent from the Washington 
bureau was also in the Dominican 
Republic. It was impossible to get a 
telephone call in or out of the coun­
try. Two days after the shooting, the 
Herald had not heard from Winfrey 
and details of the incident and the 
condition of A1 and Doug rem ained 
uncertain. Editors in the newsroom 
were cursing Winfrey until an em­
ployee from advertising called the 
newsroom and said there was this 
long telex downstairs on the ma­
chine that they could not figure out. 
He thought the telex m ight belong 
to the newsroom. It did. The telex 
gave Winfrey’s detailed account of 
the shooting incident. The message 
had been on advertising’s telex 
m achine for well over 24 hours
before anyone in that departm ent 
had bothered to notify the news­
room.
As an anecdotal footnote to that 
incident, my first trip to the 
Dominican Republic came just a 
year later and it was the one in 
which I met Jim  Goodsell. Goodsell, 
myself and, Nate Miller, the Rio- 
based correspondent for the 
Baltimore Sun (who went on to 
become a well-known naval histori­
an) hired a taxi and drove to 
Santiago to interview Antonio 
Guzman, Juan  Bosch’s vice presi­
dential candidate in the upcoming 
elections, won by Joaquin Balaguer. 
The taxi driver was the same one 
who had been driving A1 Burt and 
Doug Kennedy when they had been 
shot by the Marines a year earlier.
It was an era of erratic and ulcer- 
inducing telephone communica­
tions. To cover a breaking foreign 
story by telephone was virtually 
impossible. Calls had to be placed 
through an operator and, particu­
larly in time of crisis, telephone 
lines were so jam m ed that it often 
took hours to get a call through.
And if it happened to be a military 
coup, a frequent occurrence in the 
1960s, telephone lines were most 
likely cut.
If you were on the road, getting 
stories back to the Herald was anoth­
er problem. You either brought 
them back with you or took them  to 
the local airport and shipped them 
by Pan Am Clipper cargo. When
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the flight arrived in Miami, someone 
had to go to the cargo area on the 
west side of the airport, pick up the 
package and clear it through cus­
toms. On more pressing stories, the 
only alternative was to file by telex, 
usually by punching the telex tape 
yourself.
The major airlines flying to Latin 
America then were Pan American, 
Braniff and Panagra. Nobody in 
Latin America had ever heard of 
American or United Airlines. And 
virtually every flight to South 
America stopped in Panama at 3:00 
a.m. for a change of planes. If you 
needed to get a seat quickly on a 
sold-out Pan Am flight, you called 
Alice Flood at Pan Ain’s commercial 
desk.
Reporting itself was somewhat sim­
pler. The Cold War was in full swing 
and the us-against-them mentality 
spilled over into much of the press. 
US officials still had substantial cred­
ibility, with the decline beginning in 
the late 1960s with Vietnam and 
accelerated by Chile and Watergate. 
Unlike today, women correspon­
dents covering Latin America were a 
rarity. Georgia Anne “Geegee” Geyer 
is the only one I can recall, writing 
from Peru for the Chicago Daily News 
service.
It was not until the first half of the 
1980s that portable computers came 
on the scene, not too long after 
direct telephone dialing. Until 
then, the Olivetti Letra 22 typewriter 
was the choice de jour. I still have 
two at hom e but cannot find any­
body to recondition them. Juan 
Tamayo became the first person at 
the Herald to use a portable comput­
er, sometime in the early 1980s. It 
was an O trono and to call it port­
able is stretching the truth. I 
rem em ber more than once Tamayo 
walking out of the office with that 
thing strapped on his back. Then 
came the Tandy 200, a laptop com­
puter model.
That brings us up to the informa­
tion and transportation revolution
Journalists are reporters like Jim Goodsell who go 
off to uncomfortable and often dangerous places like 
Central America and Croatia and get on a military 
plane to chase after a visiting dignitary without 
giving it a second thought.
of recent years which has dramatical­
ly improved the timeliness of getting 
the news to the consumer. The rev­
olution also has its downside, one 
being an increase in ‘parachute’ 
journalism  which mitigates against 
good old-fashioned reporting. Now, 
a reporter can fly to a country that 
he has never been to before on a 
breaking story, having access in 
advance to virtually everything that 
has been written about the country. 
Once there, he can call down the 
latest wires, write an authoritative 
story, file it for the deadline and 
leave, without making a telephone 
call except to connect to his com­
puter. As an example, I cite the 
recent inauguration of Rene Preval 
as Flaiti’s new president. A reporter 
from a major newspaper, which shall 
remain unnam ed, was assigned at 
the last m inute to cover the inaugu­
ration. Only slightly familiar with 
Haiti, he arrived mid-afternoon on 
inauguration day, after the cere­
monies were over. Catching up on 
what had happened from colleagues 
and calling down the wires, he wrote 
and filed a story of the day’s events, 
and left early the next morning, 
spending about 18 hours in the 
country. The story, which I later 
saw, was adequate but certainly did 
not contain much insight into 
Haiti’s problems. There is also a 
trend toward more generalists 
among foreign correspondents as 
opposed to the specialists such as 
Jim  Goodsell who dedicated their 
careers to a single region, whether it 
be Latin America, Africa or Asia.
I will venture no guesses as to what 
will happen on the technological
side of journalism  over the next 
few years, having myself barely got­
ten past the Tandy 200s and direct 
dial telephoning. I assume it is 
safe to say, however, that the 
changes are likely to be startling.
The m ajor story them es will cer­
tainly continue to be related to the 
dramatic changes that began with 
the end of the Cold War. On the 
positive side, social issues will get 
m uch m ore attention, now that 
they are no longer subjugated to 
an ideological overlay. The war on 
drugs will rem ain a high profile 
topic. Coverage of free m arket 
economics and a hem isphere free 
trade area will get m ajor attention. 
Changes of governm ent—less so 
with overt military coups seemingly 
headed the way of the dodo bird— 
will also be covered. Terrorism, 
ethnic conflicts and border dis­
putes will continue to capture 
headlines. The In tern e t will feed 
the influence of NGOs, hum an 
rights and advocacy groups, making 
it better able for them  to get their 
messages out to the m edia and 
opinion makers.
In closing, I came across some­
thing recently written about anoth­
er journalist, that struck me as par­
ticularly applicable to Jim  Goodsell 
and today’s journalism . Some of 
you will probably recognize the 
story. I would like to read it, substi­
tuting J im ’s nam e for the o ther 
journalist, Nathaniel Nash.
From Tom Friedm an’s April 10 
colum n in the New York Times on 
Nathaniel Nash, who died in the 
crash of Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown’s airplane:
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With today’s cacophony of magazine 
shows, Oprah-style interview sessions and 
talking head news commentaries, many 
people have lost sight of what real jour­
nalists do. Journalists do not appear on 
the McLaughlin show and scream at 
each other. Journalists do not interview 
mothers and daughters on daytime con­
fession hours. Journalists do not have 
their own shock-jock radio shows. 
Unfortunately, though, these are the peo­
ple many Americans see most often in 
quasi-journalist roles and these are the 
people they think of as journalists today.
Journalists are reporters like Jim 
Goodsell who go off to uncomfortable and 
often dangerous places like Central 
America and Croatia and get on a mili­
tary plane to chase after a visiting digni­
tary without giving it a second 
thought— all to get a few fresh quotes, 
maybe a scoop, or even just a paragraph 
of color that no one else has...
Jim ivas a living reminder that to be 
successful, journalists do not have to be 
cynics. The book on Jim as a reporter 
was that he was too nice. His colleagues 
always doubted that anyone that nice 
could ever succeed in journalism, but 
somehow he triumphed over that handi­
cap and went from one successful assign­
ment to another. It ivas because Jim 
intuitively understood that there was a 
difference between skepticism and cyni­
cism. This is a lesson a lot of us have 
forgotten. Skepticism is about asking 
questions, being dubious, being tuary, not 
being gullible. Cynicism is about already 
having the answers— or thinking you 
do— about a person or an event. The 
skeptic says: “I  don’t think that’s true;
I ’m going to check it out. ” The cynic 
says: “Iknow that’s not true. It couldn’t 
be. I ’m going to slam him. ” There is a 
fine line between the two, but it is a line 
Jim always respected. H
Comments delivered by Don 
Bohning, a 36-year veteran staff 
writer for the Miami Herald, at the 
Fourteenth Annual Journalists and 
Editors Workshop, Miami, May 2, 
1996.
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Popular Participation Bolivian Style
M argaret H . Peirce
W
hen President 
Gonzalo Sanchez 
de Lozada, the 
author of the 
1985 draconian 
neoliberal 
reform which curbed Bolivia’s 
hyperinflation, took office on 
August 6, 1993, few were willing to 
concede that his ambitious Plan de 
Todos (Plan for All) would succeed. 
One of the principal pillars of the 
plan was the notion of “popular par­
ticipation,” an innovative proposal 
to restructure Bolivia. Criticized by 
the opposition and highly praised by 
the international community, 
Sanchez de Lozada plugged along 
with his plan. In the past two years, 
while the rest of his Plan for All 
appears to have been bogged down, 
"popular participation” has begun 
to perm eate all levels and corners of 
Bolivian society.
I m p l e m e n t in g  Pa r t ic ip a t io n
Following a massive media blitz on 
April 21, 1994, President Sanchez de 
Lozada succeeded in securing con­
gressional approval for the revolu­
tionary and controversial Popular 
Participation Law (PPL). The PPL 
divided Bolivia territorially into 
provincial sections, thereby putting 
the country under the political and 
administrative control of 308 newly 
created municipalities, which were 
endowed with provisional bound­
aries. The new municipal boundaries 
replaced 1,100 local governments.
Margaret H. Peirce is a Ph.D. student 
at the Graduate School of Internation­
al Studies at the University of Miam i. 
She served as a Peace Corps Volunteer 
in Bolivia from 1991-93.
Each municipality is now responsible 
for infrastructure and development 
related to education, health, irriga­
tion, sports, culture, and local roads. 
Municipalities receive coparticipa­
tion funds (i.e., central government- 
controlled tax revenues) to fulfill 
these needs.
The law provides for the legal 
recognition of urban barrios and 
rural communities as Organizaciones 
Tenitori.ales de Base (Territorially 
Based Organizations or TBOs) and 
establishes oversight boards known 
as comites de vigilancia (vigilance com­
mittees) . These committees are 
charged with planning projects and 
overseeing municipal governments. 
The PPL provides government funds 
and redistributes political power to 
the local level. According to World 
Bank economist Vicente Fretes-Cibis, 
“O ther countries are now trying to 
decentralize, but Bolivia is the pio­
neer.”
E m p o w e r in g  C ivil S o c iety
Bolivia's history of confrontational 
politics has frequently stood in the 
way of democratic governance.
Social groups have relied on direct 
action protest, such as hunger 
strikes, blockades, work stoppages, 
marches, and takeovers of public 
buildings. Years of such behavior 
have led civil society to rely on these 
tools as the most significant form of 
political participation, eclipsing par­
ties and the electoral arena. Since 
the transition to democracy in 1982, 
political parties on the national level 
have repudiated these methods, but 
local leaders and labor unions con­
tinue to rely upon these tactics to 
contest government action, especial­
ly the imposition of austerity meas­
ures and counternarcotics policy.
The stated goal of the Popular 
Participation Law is to improve the 
standard of living of the poor and 
traditionally marginalized sectors by 
incorporating them  into the deci­
sion-making process, thereby curtail­
ing direct action politics. A sec­
ondary goal of the PPL is to stamp 
out still existing traces of authoritari­
an behavior and replace it with a 
participatory democracy based upon 
consensus politics on all levels of 
society and government.
According to the 1992 Census,
70.5 percent of the Bolivian popula­
tion is classified as poor, including 
95.1 percent of the rural population 
and 52.6 percent of the urban popu­
lation. Bolivia has the lowest life 
expectancy (61.8 years in 1994), the 
highest infant mortality rate 
(81.4/1,000 in 1994), a population 
with the least years of schooling (4), 
and the worst Hum an Development 
Index (122) of South America.
Worse yet are the indicators of inter­
nal inequality. For example, infant 
mortality in 1992 in urban areas was 
62/1,000 compared to 100/1,000 in 
the rural areas; 81 percent of urban 
dwellers had access to potable water 
in 1992 compared with only 19 per­
cent of rural families; and finally, 
while only 9 percent of city dwellers 
are illiterate, the rural population is 
37 percent illiterate. Intraregional 
inequality and internal differences 
in standard of living have prom pted 
migratory flows, both international 
and rural-urban in nature. The 
1992 Census, which is generally 
acknowledged to have undercount­
ed the rural population, indicated 
that 57.5 percent of the population 
lives in urban areas (arbitrarily 
defined as cities of more than 2,000 
inhabitants). O ne estimate suggests
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that by the year 2000, 85 percent of 
Bolivia’s population will live in 
urban centers with a population 
greater than 100,000. Santa Cruz 
and El Alto, for example, are expect­
ed to double their population in ten 
years. Many in the government and 
elsewhere suggest that the PPL was 
designed to offset this migratory 
trend.
R e d is t r ib u t in g  Pa r t ic ip a t io n  F u n d s
With the change in the distribu­
tion of state resources via the copar­
ticipation funds m andated by the 
PPL, funds are now assigned on a 
per capita basis, with approximately 
US$ 22.00 being allocated per resi­
dent (according to the 1992 Census). 
This am ount compares favorably 
with the average US$ 14.77 distrib­
uted between 1989 and 1993, which 
ranged from a high of US$ 24.01 per 
capita in the departm ent of La Paz 
to a low of US$ 1.50 in the depart­
m ent of Potosi. The average 1995 
municipal budget is approximately 
US$ 420,000, while the median bud­
get is about US$ 160,000 per year. 
Municipal coparticipation funds 
accounted for 20 percent of the 
national treasury’s expenditures, or 
approximately US$ 144 million in 
1995. The PPL mandates that 90 
percent of coparticipation funds be 
directed towards investment in infra­
structure, leaving 10 percent for 
administration. Complaints were 
thus heard from cash-strapped 
municipal governments.
These coparticipation funds 
include the 10 percent of treasury 
expenditures formerly assigned to 
the quasi-governmental Regional 
Development Corporations (RDCs), 
which, in accordance with the 
Administrative Decentralization Law
passed on July 28, 1995, were elimi­
nated in 1996. Some corporations, 
faced with the loss of their funding, 
entered into jo in t ventures with 
municipalities which lacked suffi­
cient technical personnel; the 
municipality “contracted” the RDC 
to implement various rural develop­
m ent projects solicited by the TBOs 
and transferred the necessary funds 
to the RDC. Additionally, a 
Departmental Compensation Fund 
has been created for resource poor 
regional departments, such as 
Pando.
Eighty percent of the municipali­
ties that received money in 1994 had 
never received any money from the 
national treasury. In 1994, 54 per­
cent of coparticipation funds were 
directed toward cities and 45 per­
cent toward provinces. The three 
major cities' share was 74.9 percent, 
down from 90.8 percent. With the 
transfer of responsibilities for infra­
structure development and mainte­
nance, some municipalities, especial­
ly those that were previously favored, 
may end up with fewer budgetary 
resources. However, to augment 
their budgets, the PPL gives munici­
palities the power to tax m otor vehi­
cles and real estate.
M u n ic ip a l  G o v e r n m e n t s
Before the passage of the PPL, 
only a limited num ber of provincial 
capitals had functioning municipal 
governments. As a result of the PPL, 
Article 203 of the 1967 Constitution, 
which states that municipal jurisdic­
tions are to be determ ined and local 
governments established, is finally 
being enacted. The most populated 
municipality is that of La Paz, with
724,000 residents. The average 
municipal population is 21,000; how­
ever, the majority of municipalities 
are smaller and predominantly rural 
in nature. Approximately one-third 
of the municipalities have less than
5,000 inhabitants. These municipali­
ties are encouraged to band togeth­
er to form mancomunidades (com­
monwealths) to have access to funds 
through a PPL bank account.
Interviews with local and central 
government officials in the summer 
of 1995 indicated that the concept 
of popular participation was taking 
root far more readily in the rural 
areas than in the urban centers. 
There were more rural TBOs and 
vigilance committees than urban 
ones and more registered neighbor­
hood groups in the marginal parts 
of the city than in the casco viejo 
(old city center). Urban centers 
already have health and educational 
facilities and basic utilities—water, 
electricity, sewerage, and telephone 
service. Rural areas, by comparison, 
lack almost all of these fundamental 
services and are, therefore, more 
motivated to work together to pro­
vide for these basic hum an needs.
Additionally, many rural commu­
nities already have their own forms 
of traditional local governance 
which can easily be recognized by 
the central government. Urban 
dwellers, on the other hand, have lit­
tle incentive to organize on the local 
level. However, many argue that the 
remaining local governments that 
oppose the PPL will be forced to 
change their posture by the popu­
lace, who will dem and the benefits 
from the newly available funds.
P o p u l a r  Pa r t ic ip a t io n ’s O p p o n e n t s
Powerful civic committees (similar 
to “friends of cities” groups) consti­
tuted by self-appointed influential
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businesspersons are opposed to the 
PPL. In the major cities, these polit­
ically dom inant m embers of the 
business sector stand to lose politi­
cal power, and therefore, as a mat­
ter of self-preservation, the civic 
committees are opposed to the leg­
islation that actually benefits their 
cities.
O thers contend that the PPL is 
only a redistribution scheme, rather 
than an increase in funding. This 
criticism, however, misses the point 
since the rationale behind the law is 
to improve the equity of the distrib­
ution of funds and increase partici­
pation at the local level.
The main criticism of the actual 
im plem entation of the plan is that 
coparticipation funds are being dis­
tributed to all municipalities that 
have filed an annual operation plan 
with the government, regardless of 
whether there is a functioning vigi­
lance committee to provide 
accountability and transparency. 
Consequently, these funds are sus­
ceptible to corruption. And in the 
larger cites where TBOs have yet to 
be formed, the use of coparticipa­
tion funds is left to the discretion of 
the mayor and h is /h e r  municipal 
council. This practice increases the 
possibility of pork barreling.
Additionally, there is a conflict of 
interest and job  function between 
the junta municipal/consejo municipal 
(municipal councils) and vigilance 
committees since both  are designed 
to supervise the expenditures of 
municipal funds. There are also no 
provisions for the rem uneration of 
committee members. Furtherm ore, 
m unicipal governments are receiv­
ing a trem endous increase in copar­
ticipation funds without adequate 
administrative or legal training. 
However, several training assistance 
contracts have been signed with the 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID), the World Bank, and 
nongovernm ent organizations 
(NGOs).
The central governm ent’s 
response to these criticisms has 
been that rather than spend twenty 
years ironing out all the possible 
wrinkles of the plan, it was prefer­
able to pass the legislation and redis­
tribute the funds to the people in an 
equitable manner. The rationale was 
that problems could be sorted out 
with time and experience.
On another front, some contend 
that the PPL is a politically motivat­
ed program to build the electoral 
base of the president's Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement Party 
(MNR). Certainly, Sanchez de 
Lozada would like to be remem ­
bered as the president who took rev­
olutionary steps to restructure the 
Bolivian government. By decentral­
izing political and economic power, 
however, Sanchez de Lozada is los­
ing the ability to direct funds to 
MNR-controlled municipalities. If 
his hidden agenda were to exploit 
the program to bolster his party’s 
image and election prospects, 
Sanchez de Lozada has encountered 
failure.
A cynical interpretation of the 
whole issue surrounding the pros 
and cons of the PPL is that if funds 
are likely to be stolen, at least now 
these funds will be stolen or misused 
by many on the local level rather 
than by a feiu at the national level. If 
this is the case, a perverse redistribu­
tion scheme is now in place. As the 
president said, “Even if they’re 
drunk, they can’t do a worse job  
than we’ve done.”
P r o m o t io n  a n d  P a r t ic ip a t io n
To prom ote the concept of popu­
lar participation and improve citizen 
awareness of the PPL, the 
Communications D epartm ent of the 
National Secretariat for Popular 
Participation in the Ministry of 
Sustainable Development has 
launched a campaign the likes of 
which Bolivia has never seen. 
Government and independent agen­
cies are prom oting the PPL.
Moreover, these agencies are 
responsible for the multitude of 
pamphlets and discussion docu­
ments currently circulating 
throughout the country, many of 
which use a simple form at and pic­
tures to aid non-native Spanish 
speakers.
Interestingly, even the military is 
involved in this new initiative to for­
tify democracy. The Bolivian Armed 
Forces have traditionally been 
charged with helping to develop the 
country and actively participate in 
public works projects. New recruits 
are now routinely taught the intrica­
cies of the PPL. When these 
recruits return  to their communi­
ties, they serve as experts on the 
law.
C o n c l u s io n
Bolivia's PPL is indeed revolution­
ary and unique to Latin America. 
Bolivians have been given the politi­
cal and economic tools to partici­
pate in their own governance. The 
PPL has taken root in rural areas 
and is igniting debate throughout 
the country. In short, areas that 
never before benefited from any 
national resources are receiving 
funds and are deciding how to 
spend them. Despite the kinks in 
the program  and the funds’ suscep­
tibility to corruption and political 
influence, the PPL is certainly a step 
in the right direction.
The PPL appears destined to play 
a role in economic development 
and democratic governance in 
Bolivia. Coupled with a new 
Administrative Decentralization 
Law, the PPL could modernize the 
Bolivian state and empower the sub­
ordinate and less privileged parts of 
civil society. Vice President Victor 
Hugo Cardenas claims that these 
bold steps “will change the face of 
Bolivia.” Thus, these historic devel­
opm ents should be m onitored by 
other countries; lessons can be 
learned from this dramatic political 
and economic restructuring. ■
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Reports: Brazil
How Real Is the Plano Real?
Alfred Montero
Three years later, the entire country is still monitoring 
monthly inflation rates and trade balance figures with bated 
breath to see if  the plan will continue to deliver on Cardoso’s 
campaign promises of low inflation and stable growth.O
n July 1, 1996, the 
Plano Real (Real 
Plan), Brazil’s most 
watched, ongoing 
national event, 
tu rned  two years old. 
Fernando H enrique Cardoso 
depended upon the p lan’s initial 
success in reducing Brazil’s chronic 
mega-inflation to carry him to the 
Brazilian presidency in 1994. Three 
years later, the entire country is still 
m onitoring monthly inflation rates 
and trade balance figures with bated 
breath to see if the plan will contin­
ue to deliver on Cardoso’s cam­
paign promises of low inflation and 
stable growth. Yet skepticism has 
been voiced in the business commu­
nity and am ong international 
observers regarding the p lan’s 
emphasis on the appreciation of the 
national currency and the inability 
of congress and the presidency to 
push forward the m uch-needed con­
stitutional reforms. The plan’s long­
term success cannot be assured 
without these reforms.
In mid-1994, Cardoso’s plan was 
launched with the creation of a new 
currency, the Real, with a value 
anchored to the dollar. Unlike the 
m onetary anchor in Argentina that 
strictly fixes the national currency to 
the dollar, the Real was allowed to 
float within “bands” established by 
the central bank. Similar to the 
European M onetary System’s 
m ethod of floating national curren­
cies within “bands” linked to the 
Deutschemark, the viability of the
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Real has depended upon the stabili­
ty of its value against the dollar. By 
buying dollars when the currency 
was negotiated at a low rate to the 
Real and selling when the rate was 
slightly higher, the central bank 
floated the value of the Real 
between high and low values, a tac­
tic that guarded against sudden 
devaluations but nevertheless 
allowed the new currency to gradu­
ally devalue. Meanwhile, the central 
bank was periodically moving the 
“bands” within which the Real float­
ed to the dollar. At the beginning 
of the plan, the Real traded at $1.20, 
but by mid-1996, the Real traded at 
$.98.
During its first few months, the 
Real Plan was a resounding success 
that assured the election of Cardoso 
as president in late 1994—without 
the need for a run-off. Annual rates 
of inflation fell from 11,161 percent 
during the pre-Real days to 24 per­
cent in 1995 and an estimated 12-15 
percent in 1996, the lowest Brazilian 
inflation rates since the 7 percent 
figure recorded in 1957. And, more 
importantly, the plan put an end to 
the inflationary expectations that in 
the past drove rates spiraling 
upwards. The slight increases in the 
monthly inflation rates of 
Septem ber and October 1994 gener­
ated widespread talk of the Real 
Plan's prem ature failure, but such 
expectations quickly subsided as
monthly inflation rates continued 
on a stable, low trajectory.
Presently, most Brazilian businesses 
work with nom inal figures uncor­
rected for the expected rate of infla­
tion; indexation of salaries for infla­
tion is being phased out.
The success of the Real Plan, how­
ever, has no t come cheaply to a 
country with a long history of failed 
stabilization plans. The “ban d ” sys­
tem kept the Real overvalued by at 
least 15-20 percent, although some 
international estimates suggest an 
overvaluation in the neighborhood 
of 30-40 percent. The price of keep­
ing the Real stable at these levels 
required the expansion of large for­
eign dollar reserves, a task made 
more difficult by periodic trade 
deficits. The overvalued Real 
reduced the competitiveness of 
exports and put an end to several 
years of large annual trade surplus­
es. And, more importantly, the con­
stitutional and fiscal reforms neces­
sary for consolidating macroeco­
nomic stability—privatization, tax 
reform, reducing the size of the 
public payroll, am ong others—were 
either delayed or im plem ented at a 
snail’s pace.
“W e a re  n o t  M e x ic o !”
The dangers of an overvalued 
Real were made clear shortly after 
the December 1994 maxi-devalua­
tion crisis in Mexico when a combi-
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nation of large trade deficits and 
low dollar reserves left Ernesto 
Zedillo’s governm ent unable to pre­
vent the dum ping of $10 billion of 
short-term peso bonds by foreign 
speculators following an announced 
devaluation of the currency. The 
resulting crisis presented several 
lessons for Brazil.
First, the Mexican example 
emphasized the dangers of main­
taining long-term, large trade imbal­
ances and not enforcing a devalua­
tion of the national currency. After 
several years of large annual trade 
surpluses ($15 billion in 1992, $13 
billion in 1993 and $10 billion in 
1994), Brazil ran its largest trade 
deficit in 15 years in 1995: $3.5 bil­
lion. The initial signs of a crisis—an 
$884 million trade deficit in 
December 1994 and one over $1 bil­
lion in February 1995—were 
enough to send central bank offi­
cials scrambling to counterattack 
the spreading fears of Brazil’s 
im pending “M exicanization.” 
Adamantly opposed to a Chilean- 
style maxi-devaluation, Cardoso’s 
governm ent employed more piece­
meal methods to improve Brazil’s 
alarming trade imbalances. In April 
1995, the governm ent increased tar­
iffs on im ported automobiles from 
32 percent to 70 percent and slight­
ly accelerated the pace of the Real’s 
gradual devaluation by use of the 
“band” system.
Second, the Mexican example 
pointed to the im portance of main­
taining high domestic dollar 
reserves to scare off foreign m one­
tary speculators. This lesson proved 
especially valuable and costly in 
March 1995 when fears spread in 
the financial community that 
Argentina was without enough
reserves to save its banking system. 
The m ore serious “tequila” effect in 
Argentina generated anxieties 
among foreign investors in nearby 
Brazil. Brazilian central bank offi­
cials spent more than $7 billion of 
reserves in just one week to stabilize 
the Real against a possible run  by 
speculators. The governm ent’s 
reaction also included reducing 
taxes on foreign direct investment 
and raising real interest rates, a 
move that increased the flow of for­
eign money from the money market 
into governm ent debt paper.
Although the Real Plan survived 
the March 1995 scare, many inter­
national observers continued to crit­
icize the Cardoso administration for 
not dealing with the fundam ental 
problem  of the currency’s overvalu­
ation. The most publicized criticism 
was voiced in an academic confer­
ence in Sydney, Australia, in May 
1996 when Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology economist, Rudiger
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Dornbusch, stated that the Real was 
overvalued 30-40 percent and that 
Brazil was well on its way to becom­
ing another Mexico. Dornbusch’s 
comments generated an immediate 
response on the Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro stock markets—both fell 
2 percent. Brazilian government 
officials and economists lambasted 
Dornbusch’s estimate of the Reals 
overvaluation and pointed to for­
eign reserves of $45 billion, substan­
tial increases in foreign direct 
investment (rather than in poten­
tially speculative portfolio invest­
ment) , and stabilizing trade bal­
ances during the second half of
1995 and the first half of 1996 as 
factors that suggested a situation 
most unlike that of Mexico. As 
Eliana Cardoso, one of Brazil’s most 
prom inent economists and 
Dornbusch’s ex-wife declared in 
Folha de Sao Paulo in June: “We are 
not Mexico!”
An assessment of the Real Plan’s 
perform ance up to its second 
anniversary reveals that both 
Dornbusch and his critics are right. 
The Real is certainly overvalued, but 
most estimates lie somewhere in the 
10-20 percent range than in 
Dornbusch’s 30-40 percent range. 
The main question is how fast the 
Real should be devalued. Dornbusch 
argued for a maxi-devaluation along 
the lines of the Chilean experience. 
Yet the inflationary effects seen in 
the Chilean case could prove disas­
trous in Brazil where memories of 
chronic inflation might generate 
another inflationary spiral following 
the initial devaluation.
Recent developments on Brazil's 
commercial and current accounts 
do not justify pushing the panic but­
ton of a maxi-devaluation. After the 
“tequila” effect scares of the first 
half of 1995, the country’s trade bal­
ance improved and reached a small 
surplus of $1.1 billion during the 
second half of 1995 and a modest 
deficit of about $300 million in the 
first five months of 1996. An esti­
m ated $6 billion of new foreign 
direct investment, $3 billion of new 
portfolio investment, and $4 billion 
in unilateral transfers from emi­
grants are expected to finance this 
year’s expected current account 
deficit of $15 billion. The shortfall 
will likely be made up by long-term 
finance from international agencies. 
These indicators suggest that the 
prospects for the Reals stability have 
not dramatically worsened as the 
peso’s before its collapse in 
December 1994.
In comparison to Mexico on the 
eve of the “tequila” crisis, Brazil is in 
a far better position. While the 
Mexican current account deficit 
stood at 7.8 percent of GDP, the 
trade deficit at 5 percent of GDP, 
and international reserves at only 
$6.3 billion before the crisis, Brazil’s 
current account deficit is presently 
2.4 percent of GDP, the commercial 
deficit stands at only .4 percent of 
GDP and international reserves are 
estimated to be as high as $55.4 bil­
lion.
More long-term indicators of the 
economy’s health and the Real 
P lan’s viability are the recent surges 
in foreign direct investment and 
export growth. Conservative esti­
mates suggest that between $6 and 
$7 billion of new foreign direct 
investment will enter Brazil in 1996, 
a substantial increase in comparison 
to the last three to four years. An 
additional $3 billion will be invested 
in the subsidiaries of multinationals 
already in the country. Although 
slow in its im plementation, the pri­
vatization process has recently gen­
erated new foreign investment with 
the sale of Rio de Janeiro ’s electrici­
ty distributor, Light, to an American 
firm. The dem onopolization of pub­
lic control over telecommunications 
systems has generated estimates of 
over $15-$20 billion of new foreign 
investment in that sector alone over 
the next five years as foreign firms 
scramble to take advantage of 
Brazil’s large domestic market for 
cellular phones, satellite television 
and com puter technology. Most 
telling of all for the Real is the fact 
that exports, after growing a paltry
2 percent during 1995, grew 10 per­
cent in the first half of 1996, a good 
predictor of a trade surplus at year’s 
end.
In comparison to these long-term 
investments, short-term capital com­
poses a rather m eager source of 
finance. Less than 10 percent of 
foreign reserves depend on short­
term capital; m uch of this capital 
stays in the country three to four 
years on average. If these trends 
continue, and particularly if the 
commercial balance does not spiral 
out of control into the red, a 
Mexico-style collapse will be avoid­
ed.
T h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  R efo r m s
The most im portant lesson of the 
Mexican example for the Real 
Plan’s architects is also the one least 
heeded: the need to take concrete 
steps to get the fiscal deficit under 
control. In this area, Brazilian offi­
cials lack both courage and realism 
in the face of the country’s prob­
lems, many of which are structural 
and long-term. The governm ent’s 
piecemeal approach of toying with 
gradual devaluations, employing 
selective tariffs and raising interest
The probabilities that privatization will rescue Brazil’s 
decaying infrastructure are not good. Foreign firms are 
wary of venturing into this area since Brasilia has yet to 
regulate the process of granting public concessions.
12 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
Reports: Brazil
rates to contain domestic dem and, 
may prop up the Real Plan in the 
short-term, but structural adjust­
m ents on the size of public expendi­
tures, the ownership and size of 
state firms, the massive public pay­
roll and the budgets of state govern­
ments are all necessary to make the 
plan successful in the long-term.
On this point both international 
observers such as Dornbusch and 
Brazilian economists agree, 
although the country’s politicians 
have been hesitant to take the 
aggressive action recom m ended by 
these experts.
Although moving at an overall 
slow pace, privatization is a key 
structural reform  that has been 
attem pted in recent years. The 
process peaked early when the 
Fernando Collor administration ini­
tiated the privatization of the state 
steel firms, beginning with Usiminas 
in 1991. Cosipa, Agominas, Acesita, 
and the National Steel Company fol­
lowed, along with several other 
smaller steel and iron facilities. The 
Itam ar Franco administration, how­
ever, barely initiated any new privati­
zations. During his presidential 
campaign, Cardoso promised to ini­
tiate and complete the privatization 
of Brazil’s largest firm, Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the min­
ing and transportation giant. This 
goal was set for 1996, but was 
delayed by congress until 1997. 
Indeed, only the privatization of Rio 
de Jane iro ’s Light in May 1996 for 
$2.2 billion—most of this am ount in 
“live” money rather than public 
debt issues—reflected the Cardoso 
adm inistration's best effort in this 
policy area.
Observers are quick to point out 
that practically all of the already pri­
vatized firms were “privatizable”— 
reasonably productive and potential­
ly profitable before they were sold. 
By contrast, what lies ahead, with 
the exception of CVRD, are a num ­
ber of irreparably unprofitable state 
firms, many of these in the area of
infrastructure. Also, a great deal of 
public money, particularly loans at 
subsidized rates from the National 
Development Bank, was poured into 
Usiminas, Acesita and other state 
firms to restructure them —to make 
them  more productive to eventually 
sell them  off. Similarly significant 
levels of public expenditures on the 
federal road system, the country’s 
decrepit ports, and the dilapidated 
railroad network are unlikely in the 
near future. The alternative of 
opening these areas to private con­
cessions has only progressed slowly. 
Some states like Rio de Janeiro and 
Minas Gerais have taken the initia­
tive by granting concessions on state 
and municipal roads and ports, 
often as part of an infrastructure 
loan with the World Bank, while 
national policies continue to stall in 
congress.
The probabilities that privatiza­
tion will rescue Brazil’s decaying 
infrastructure are not good.
Foreign firms are wary of venturing 
into this area since Brasilia has yet 
to regulate the process of granting 
public concessions. Thus far, 
investors have shown primary inter­
est in either the already profitable 
steel production and energy distrib­
ution companies or high-tech sec­
tors with promising domestic mar­
kets like telecommunications sys­
tems.
Getting the fiscal deficit under 
control also means cutting expendi­
tures at the state and federal levels 
on the expansive and redundant 
civil service. Spending on the feder­
al civil service constituted 74 per­
cent of federal tax receipts (exclud­
ing receipts transferred to the states 
and cities) in 1992. The 1988 
Constitution made wholesale dis­
missals in the civil service extremely 
difficult to implement, and recent 
attempts to reform  the Magna Carta 
in this area have met with stiff resis­
tance from different political groups 
as diverse as the conservative gover­
nors from the Northeast and the
leftist labor unions. Thus far, such 
reforms are stuck in congress, 
although some state governments 
have had some success. Minas 
Gerais recently reduced its public 
payroll by providing incentive plans 
for voluntary retirem ent.
Federal and state tax receipts have 
increased over the last three years as 
a result of the m odernization of tax 
collection agencies and the prosecu­
tion of tax evasion. Yet the tax sys­
tem is still too chaotic and ineffi­
cient. Each state government, for 
example, may set its own tax rates 
on commerce of goods and services, 
creating extra costs for businesses 
wishing to conduct interstate com­
merce in states with higher tax 
rates. Attempts to create a m ore 
nationally unified tax system contin­
ue to draw m uch attention in 
Brasilia, but significant steps have 
yet to be taken.
A more immediate problem  is the 
financial system which has suffered 
from a wave of bankruptcies that 
followed the governm ent’s hike in 
interest rates (during the Mexico 
crisis) to exorbitant levels. Spreads 
of 65 percent and 90 percent have 
been a common occurrence. As a 
result, a num ber of Brazil’s largest 
banks threatened to collapse. In 
response, the Cardoso administra­
tion created PROER, a public bail­
out program  for prom oting finan­
cial mergers and restructuring. 
Despite a significant com m itm ent of 
$13 billion during the first seven 
m onths of PROER’s existence, con­
fidence in Brazilian banks continues 
to flag. Already larger and more 
costly bail-outs are required to save 
key banks. BANESPA, the state bank 
of Sao Paulo, was recently bailed out 
of its close to $10 billion debt.
Banco Nacional, a large private 
bank fraught with cases of fraud, is 
currently negotiating a $6.7 billion 
bail-out. Whatever the success of 
PROER in rescuing the financial sys­
tem, paying for this program  will be 
a challenge. Dealing with the weight
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of these expenditures on the state’s 
fiscal budget deficit over the course 
of the next few years will dem and 
significant structural reforms now.
The combination of a large influx 
of dollars during the Real Plan and 
increasing public expenditures has 
already generated an internal debt 
crisis to rival the external debt crisis 
of the 1980s. The use of the public 
debt in the im plementation of m on­
etary policy, privatization and finan­
cial reform  has created an internal 
debt estimated at $150 billion. If 
structural reforms are not imple­
m ented soon, the full weight of this 
debt may cause faith in the Real to 
soon crumble.
E l im in a t in g  t h e  “ B razil  C o s t ”
The Real Plan may have provided 
firms with stable prices with which 
to do business, but it also created 
added pressures to adjust to more 
competitive global markets. The 
overvalued Real forced many 
exporters to reduce labor costs by 
downsizing their staff, m odernizing 
their plant and equipm ent, and 
increasing the productivity of their 
workers and their links with suppli­
ers. Firms able to adjust to the new 
terms of trade could make the tran­
sition. Most firms, however, shrunk 
significantly or collapsed before the 
double hit of the Reals overvalua­
tion and the high interest rates that 
the plan required.
Recent developments in the auto 
parts sector highlight the trouble 
domestic firms have had in adjust­
ing to global competition. The 
trade balance for Brazilian auto 
parts fell from a surplus of $1.4 
billion in 1989 to $500 million in 
1995. Employment decreased by
30,000 jobs at the beginning of 1995 
as firms scrambled to reduce their 
production costs. Meanwhile, the 
high cost of capital produced a sig­
nificant drop in imports: from 16 
percent to 2 percent during the 
Real Plan. The result was the clo­
sure of dozens of auto parts firms
and large buy outs of the most pro­
ductive Brazilian firms by m ultina­
tionals possessing more advanced 
technology and access to capital. In 
June 1996, Metal Leve, the crown 
jewel of Brazilian auto parts, was 
purchased by the German giant 
Mahle in association with its domes­
tic competitor, Cofap.
For firms in auto parts, textiles, 
footwear, and other industrial sec­
tors, the costs of doing business in 
Brazil—the so-called Brazil cost with 
all its inheren t inefficiencies (poor 
infrastructure, prolonged down­
time, untrained labor and lack of 
access to technology and capital) — 
required significant restructuring of 
production and employment. Most 
firms have reduced their production 
and labor costs and have boosted 
their productivity. The average 
industrial firm after 1992 increased 
its productivity 7 percent.
Although salaries increased 
approximately 30 percent during 
the Real Plan, total employment 
dropped. One indicator of the 
immensity of this restructuring is 
the fact that the Brazilian economy 
currently produces 31 percent more 
than it did four years ago but the 
economy employs fewer people. 
Estimates of unem ploym ent in the 
Greater Sao Paulo area often reach 
16-18 percent, despite increasing 
economic activity.
The process of productive restruc­
turing m ight well have been 
inevitable with trade liberalization, 
but the Real Plan certainly acceler­
ated the restructuring process and 
made it more difficult for most 
firms to cope with the changes.
This point reveals significant limita­
tions in the Cardoso governm ent’s 
approach on the economy. By rely­
ing almost completely on macroeco­
nomic policy, the administration has 
been late in realizing how the Real 
Plan has affected the economy. 
Recent concerns of avoiding a 
Mexico-like crisis and reversing 
politically troubling unem ploym ent
rates have only led to additional 
piecemeal measures. For example, 
the National Development Bank 
created in June 1996 a series of 
financial programs to prom ote 
exports and is currently studying 
the possibilities of a national finan­
cial system for small- and medium- 
size firms to increase employment.
Ev a l u a t io n : L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d ?
The main lesson from the first 
two years of the Real Plan is that 
there is m ore to stabilizing an econ­
omy’s growth than bringing down 
inflation. A few years ago, a relative­
ly low rate of inflation would have 
satisfied most Brazilians, but now, 
increasingly larger num bers of busi­
nesses, labor unions and consumer 
organizations are dem anding gov­
ernm ent action to alleviate structur­
al problems such as unemployment, 
the high cost of capital and the 
inadequacy of infrastructure. 
Dealing with these problems 
requires a state capable of interven­
ing in the economy, and in Brazil, 
such a state requires the constitu­
tional and administrative reforms 
that policy makers and politicians 
seem so reluctant to tackle. Added 
to these problems is the macroeco­
nomic necessity of keeping the Real 
on the path of a gradual devalua­
tion. This option will help exports 
and consequently growth, but more 
diversified policy responses are 
needed to address unem ploym ent 
and the problems of the financial 
system.
In the end, Dornbusch’s criticism 
of the Real Plan is a welcomed 
warning that shocked Brazilian poli­
cy makers and society into evaluat­
ing the choices they have made dur­
ing the last two years. The warning 
signaled that everything was not all 
right simply because inflation 
rem ained low. Disaster may not be 
around the corner, but if the 
reforms are not im plem ented soon, 
Dornbusch's prem onition may 
come true. ■
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Reports: Colombia
Back to Basics
Leonardo Ferreira
I
s the second oldest democracy 
of Latin America in “clear and 
present danger” of destruc­
tion? Novelist Tom Clancy 
and the US government would 
assumedly answer ‘apparently.’ 
On March 1, 1996, eight months 
before the US presidential vote, the 
White House decertified Colombia 
as an uncooperative state in the war 
against drugs, as a republic where 
even its president is at the mercy of 
drug cartels by accepting payments 
of up to six million dollars in the last 
election (1994).
Colombians are not living through 
another Violencia, the conflict which 
caused a minimum of 200,000 deaths 
following World War II. As a precau­
tion against violence, recent adminis­
trations have banned live broadcasts 
of terrorist and subversive acts 
including communiques and inter­
views with narcotraffickers or guerril­
la groups. Yet, a democracy such as 
Colombia, weak and in fear, needs 
remedies far from media controls, 
beyond sweeping legal reforms or 
presidential recalls. Colombia 
requires—deserves—a fresh social 
agenda stemming from the effective 
protection of fundamental liberties 
and prerogatives.
In  S e a rc h  o f  Salvation
For two decades, to paraphrase 
Archbishop Pedro Rubiano, drug 
corruption was an “elephant”— 
Colombia’s adopted symbol for dis­
honesty—sitting supposedly unde­
tected in the presidential palace’s 
foyer. How could a retired army
Leonardo Ferreira is an assistant profes­
sor at the School of Communication of 
the University of Miami.
sergeant amass a one-billion-dollar 
fortune without being suspected of 
narcotrafficking? Thousands of 
Colombians, particularly members of 
the elite, contributed to the moral 
erosion of the country by profiting 
from drug proceeds. As President 
Samper acknowledges, “Let’s not be 
hypocrites. This society went about 
tolerating drug trafficking in such a 
way that what we need is an escape 
for all of us, not just for m e.”
Presidential candidate Alvaro 
Gomez proposed in 1990 a “National 
Salvation Movement.” After being 
kidnapped by the guerrilla and 
defeated in three presidential elec­
tions, Gomez insisted that Colombia 
was ill and in need of radical reform. 
On November 2, 1995, he was assassi­
nated.
Colombian society has been histor­
ically shaped by armed conflicts. To 
understand its character, it is essen­
tial to examine the relationship 
between political unrest and human 
rights.
T h e  R ig h t  t o  L ive
There are no definite numbers on 
the casualties of Colombia’s drug 
war. Colonel Jose Leonardo Gallego, 
director of the antinarcotics police, 
has revealed that over 8,400 individu­
als fell victims to drug terrorism in 
the last decade. Forty percent of 
these individuals were murdered, 
including one minister of justice, 
one attorney general, four presiden­
tial candidates (notably, Luis Carlos 
Galan in 1989), eighteen magistrates, 
fifteen judges, hundreds of police 
officers, public officials, party mili­
tants, and civilians.
Journalist Maria Jim ena Duzan, 
author of an authoritative book on 
drug cartels, calculates her home­
land’s sacrifice at 60,000 lives in the 
second half of the 1980s. A CBS sta­
tion in Miami estimates the country’s 
death toll at nearly 45,000 people, 
and Latin American Guide claims 
there were 30,050 assassinations in 
this Andean state between 1993-94. 
No one really knows how many peo­
ple have died in the so-called 
Colombian drug war.
Foreign commentators attribute 
this violence to the “aggressive” 
habits of Colombians, primarily radi­
cal politics and drug trafficking. For 
these commentators, the former 
“South American Athens”—Santafe 
de Bogota—may very well be “the 
most dangerous city on earth.” 
Colombians reject, even resent this 
behavior label as simplistic and dis­
criminatory, recognizing narcotraf­
ficking as the source of most human 
rights crimes, primarily m urder and 
kidnapping.
T h e  R ig h t  t o  P eace
The last Colombian constitutional 
convention concluded that there is 
no democracy without harmony. On 
July 5, 1991, the new ‘Magna Carta’ 
commanded every citizen to work 
for peace and the protection of fun­
damental rights as the basis for toler­
ance and coexistence.
Five years into the enactm ent of 
the new constitution, however, target­
ed killings, kidnapping, and other 
forms of aggression continue. In 
1995, Human Rights Watch con­
dem ned Colombia as a nominal 
democracy where torture remains a 
daily reality, impunity is the rule, and 
“disposable” people (street children, 
homosexuals, and beggars) are mur­
dered in “social-cleansing orgies” by 
paramilitary squads often linked to 
the military.
16 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
The one message—basic rights!
Reports: Colombia
It took drug cartels, death squads, 
sicarios (hired criminals), guerrillas, 
and narcopolitical and military con­
spirators less than a decade to push 
Colombia down a slope of death, 
corruption, and lawlessness. Anyone 
could be killed or kidnapped.
Cripton TV news director Diana 
Turbay, for instance, daughter of for­
mer president Julio Cesar Turbay 
(1978-82), was not as lucky as Juan 
Carlos Gaviria, brother of OAS 
Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, 
who was kidnapped and miraculous­
ly freed thanks to Fidel Castro’s 
intervention. Soon after Cesar 
Gaviria assumed the Colombian 
presidency, Diana Turbay was killed 
while being rescued in a crossfire 
between the police and the 
Extraditables, the squadron set up by 
Pablo Escobar. Noticia de un Secuestro 
(News of a Kidnapping), Garcia- 
M arquez’s latest book, describes this 
tragic episode as the “bestial dram a” 
lived by Colombians for more than 
twenty years.
Fr e e d o m  o f  Ex p r e ss io n
Days before chief editor Raul 
Echavarria of Cali’s Occidente was 
assassinated in September 1986, 
Guillermo Cano of El Espectador 
deplored the “narcotized state of 
public opinion.” After m ounting a 
strong defense of extradition as a 
compelling instrum ent against drug 
cartels, Cano was machine-gunned, 
in December 1986, in front of his 
daily, the oldest newspaper in 
Colombia. On September 2, 1989, 
the Extraditables tried to literally kill 
Cano’s El Espectador by igniting a car 
bomb next to the newspaper’s build­
ing in Bogota. Yet, virtually 
destroyed, the newspaper never 
stopped printing.
Cano is only one of many media 
martyrs. Duzan estimates that 70 
reporters were m urdered between 
1986-91. One night in 1982, while 
working for El Espectador, Maria 
Jimena Duzan survived a midnight 
dynamite explosion. Sylvia, her 
younger sister, was not as fortunate. 
On February 26, 1990, on assign­
m ent for a British TV docum entary 
in a guerrilla town, Sylvia Duzan and 
three peasant leaders were killed by 
paramilitary m en including an off- 
duty police officer. According to the 
Inter-American Press Association, 
out of 144 journalists m urdered in 
the Americas between 1988-93, 57 
died in Colombia.
U nder pressure, despite powerful 
incentives to look the o ther way, 
Colombian journalists maintain a 
brave front to keep their audiences 
informed. In this struggle, Article 20 
of the 1991 Constitution plays a piv­
otal role, guaranteeing everyone’s 
liberty to express thoughts and opin­
ions (including the right to disclose 
and receive truthful and impartial 
information). Indeed, the new con­
stitution defines communication as a 
competitive, participatory, and 
socially responsible activity. A chap­
ter on social, economic, and cultural 
rights also intends to “protect” the 
freedom and independence of the 
journalism  profession. Old notions 
of public order, social morality, and 
state of emergency have, at least on 
paper, given way to ideas of popular 
freedom, impartiality, and fairness.
The Supreme Court decides what 
this rhetoric means in practice. For 
years, social responsibility has been 
an attractive but disappointing theo­
ry in Colombia, inasmuch as there 
are no guidelines on when and how 
reporters are deem ed responsible.
In an overly commercialized envi­
ronm ent, defamation is a crime and 
its defense limited when compared 
to systems where libel is a civil mat­
ter. News on social issues are 
exempted, but media organizations 
must prove the truthfulness of their 
assertions. Public officials and pub­
lic figures regularly force the press 
to retract statements without having 
to prove actual malice. Sometimes 
news organizations complain about 
authorities being “too tolerant with 
[critics], letting them  do and say 
whatever they want.” Unfortunately, 
freedom of expression for many 
Colombians is still a privilege, not a 
right.
S o c ia l  P a r t ic ip a t io n
The new constitution introduced 
notions of utmost im portance for 
the country such as the People’s 
Defender (Ombudsman), the 
Fiscalia (to fight back impunity), the 
Constitutional Court, and limitations 
on the power of presidents to 
declare emergencies—thus ending 
the pernicious “state of siege” of pre­
vious decades. O ther revolutionary 
concepts were also introduced to the 
Colombian legal system. These ele­
ments included the people’s right to 
receive impartial information and to 
take tutela action (guarding funda­
mental rights), the legality of a dual 
citizenship, and basic economic and 
cultural amenities such as the right 
to live in a healthy environment.
Legal reforms rarely bring instant 
change—if at all. The unequal dis­
tribution of wealth, the increasing 
gap between the rich and the poor, 
the lack of basic needs, and the per­
sistent climate of violence against 
children are huge barriers to the 
participatory society the 1991
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Constitution envisions. Access to fun­
damental domains such as informa­
tion, education, technology, and the 
arts is shrinking rather than expand­
ing. As with freedom of the press, 
there has been little advancement in 
social participation.
A first wave of privatization gave 
the wrong impression that Colombia 
was better off. Improvements, if any, 
have hardly reached the needy. In 
his inaugural speech. President 
Samper vowed a Pacto Social whereby 
special attention will be paid to the 
poor. Within a few days, the 
“Contract with Colombia” was 
reduced to a series of scandals 
involving the president himself.
Colombia has shown a preference 
for a modus vivendi typified by aggra­
vated levels of socioeconomic con­
centration, speculation, monopoliza­
tion, intolerance and discrimination. 
The law of the jungle has taken over 
the country’s ethics.
S elf-D e t e r m in a t io n
Sovereignty, the people’s right to 
secure their own future free from 
external interference, is a fervent 
issue in Colombia. In fact, self-deter­
mination seems more and more 
im portant insofar as numerous 
Colombians feel politically, economi­
cally, and even ethnically discrimi­
nated by the industrialized world.
The US decertification, the constant 
threat of US commercial sanctions, 
and the repeated harassment of 
Colombian nationals at 
U S/European embassies and ports 
of entry have heightened the senti­
m ent of anti-imperialism against 
world powers, particularly the 
United States.
President Clinton, who has never 
set foot in the Americas in spite of 
the “Miami spirit” of the 1994 sum­
mit, has a policy towards Latin 
America as unpredictable as 
Colombia’s immediate future. In the 
meantime, Colombians watch the 
news. A 1996 national survey by the 
US Departm ent of Health showed
that use of cocaine, LSD, and mari­
juana among teenagers rose a 105 
percent between 1992-95. Public 
broadcasters report that cocaine is as 
easy to get as a pint of Haagen-Dazs 
ice cream or a pack of Marlboros in 
North America. Self-determination is 
a touchy issue in the Andean region, 
largely because of the First World 
rhetoric about the war on narcotics.
In  N eed  o f  A c t io n
Respect for life and peace must be 
the priority for any democratic 
progress in Colombia. This country 
needs a serious peace plan imple­
menting a lasting cease-fire, an open 
amnesty with the guerrilla and the 
paramilitary, and a reform of the 
armed forces and the justice system.
While protecting its national sover­
eignty, Colombia should improve 
both its image and relations with the 
North. Therefore, Colombians must 
repeal the prohibition on nonextra­
dition of nationals. Respect for inter­
national law is imperative if the goal
is to dem and committed action from 
other countries against illegal drugs. 
Colombia could internationalize this 
problem by placing arrested drug 
traffickers in the hands of the U.N. 
and other multilateral bodies. If nec­
essary, world drug tribunals ought to 
be created giving narcotrafficking 
the rank of a crime against hum ani­
ty.
Hum an rights in Colombia also 
means the obligation to guarantee 
safe and ample freedom of expres­
sion, particularly the right to criti­
cize government officials without 
intimidation. The social responsibili­
ty of the press cannot be an excuse 
to censor speech. In the end, the key 
towards resolving this country’s 
social problems lies in the right of 
the impoverished to participate in 
society. Decisive action against 
absolute poverty is the only way out 
of the dilemmas of this hemisphere. 
Colombians need com petent action 
to safeguard their basic hum an 
rights. ■
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Reports: Cuba
One Step Forward, Ten Steps Back
Gerardo Gonzalez
uban society is facing a 
very complex economic 
and political situation. 
The events surround­
ing the February 24,
1996 downing of two 
civilian aircraft and the subsequent 
announcem ent from the Com­
munist Party politburo of a new ide­
ological offensive, complicated the 
domestic scene at a time when sev­
eral factors augured a more propi­
tious framework for a transition on 
the island. Such a transition point­
ed toward an economic and politi­
cal restructuring with different char­
acteristics from the prevailing struc­
ture.
O n e  S t e p  F orw ard
The economic results of 1995 and 
a “softening” in the relations with 
the US were two positive factors 
which could pave the way for future 
change. While it is prem ature to 
state that the Cuban economy has 
entered into a phase of sustained 
recovery, the results thus far have 
dem onstrated that the downward 
spiral has been halted. In contrast 
to the weak economic growth of 
1994, which was basically inflation­
ary and driven by the recovery of a 
few nonproductive services, the 2.5 
percent growth rate achieved in 
1995 was more impressive. This 
growth rate was largely the result of 
significant increases in productive 
sectors such as nickel (64.4 per­
cent), tobacco (52 percent), and 
steel (45.7 percent). (These sectors 
have benefited from im portant
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doses of foreign investment.) The 
recovery had three o ther im portant 
dimensions: a significant increase 
in exports (20 percent); the stabi­
lization of the exchange rate rela­
tive to the US dollar; and, the 
reduction of the fiscal deficit to 3.6 
percent of GDP.
The transformation occurring in 
Cuban society is a result of a strate­
gy to confront the impact of a crisis. 
These changes are incipient but in 
the mid- to long-term, they will sig­
nify a new economic and social 
restructuring of the island. The 
presence of foreign investment in 
the most dynamic sectors of the 
economy produced substantial 
changes in the way in which modes 
of production, distribution and con­
sumption are organized. These 
changes have had grave repercus­
sions in o ther sectors of the national 
economy, forced to seek in terna­
tionally competitive levels and to 
acquire the same technological and 
organizational patterns prevalent in 
the mixed and private sectors. A 
significant impact has been felt in 
the productive matrix which will 
imply major shifts in the nature of 
the productive sector. First, state 
administrators will have to adapt to 
the market-oriented culture brought 
in by foreign investors and will have 
to forego state paternalism—adm in­
istrators could derive a greater share 
of power due to their contacts with 
the world market. Second, labor 
relations in all state enterprises will 
also undergo a severe transforma­
tion. As a result, a contradiction 
has developed due to the state’s 
requirem ent of high levels of capital 
accumulation and labor intensive 
technological and productivity 
norms.
Such a scenario inevitably implies 
the appearance of new conflictive 
areas and the shifting of power quo­
tas to the emerging entrepreneurial 
elite. As a consequence, it also 
implies the obsolescence of many 
mechanisms, practices, and partici­
pation arrangem ents that character­
ized the previous paternalistic 
scheme. Thus, there will be a need 
to develop a process of adjustment 
and institutional development capa­
ble not only of dealing with these 
contradictions but also of empower­
ing workers with mechanisms in 
tune with the new reality.
The adoption of market norm s 
has implied a cardinal variation 
from the rules of the game that 
guided the Cuban economy and 
society for more than three decades. 
U nder the socialist project, the state 
played a highly centralized role 
based on the notion that only the 
central government—possessing a 
national perspective of the prob­
lems and arm ed with vast financial 
assets—was capable of protecting all 
social interests and achieving the 
principal national objectives which 
included: creating a basic infrastruc­
ture; developing key sectors of the 
economy; guaranteeing social jus­
tice; and ensuring national indepen­
dence.
While these considerations were 
justified at certain historical 
moments, the adoption of uniform 
measures to carry out national 
objectives did not necessarily satisfy 
the dem ands of distinct social sec­
tors. As a result, these sectors were 
totally subordinated to the central 
government.
With the onslaught of the crisis, 
state prerogatives and decision-mak­
ing capacity became restricted by
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In the clutches of the past
A cartoon from  a Cuban newspaper, Juventud Rebelde. The caption reads, “I ’m 
renting it to some foreigners.” The snail is referring to his shell, of course.
the dramatic scarcity of resources, 
which severely penalized the inter­
ests and necessities of the social sec­
tors that depended on the state. In 
this context, the 1993 reforms 
placed the m arket in open competi­
tion with the state as the source for 
the redistribution of income, 
resources, and place of survival. As 
a result, im portant segments of the 
population enjoyed a relative liber­
alization from state tutelage as they 
resorted to the m arket in search of 
economic roles and resources that 
the state could no longer deliver.
On the political front, the state 
was also forced to make conces­
sions. With the collapse of the 
socialist camp and the precipitation 
of the economic crisis, the ideologi­
cal dogmas that sustained the gov­
ernm ent began to crumble—as did 
the capacity of the Communist Party 
to exercise control. Thus, in Cuban 
society, a gradual clamor for a 
“socialization” of power and for a 
forum  for political debate began to 
develop. Cuba’s leadership attem pt­
ed to abort or prevent these social 
demands from playing a role in 
state institutions. To the govern­
m ent’s dismay, a period of rich pub­
lic debate em erged as of 1990 thus 
becoming an “informal marketplace 
of debate.” One of the most signifi­
cant m oments came during the dis­
cussion for the convocation of the 
Fourth Party Congress. Thousands 
of proposals were made, revealing 
the plurality of opinions that could 
be found in Cuba in the early 1990s.
The vocalization of dem ands was 
also the result of the m aturation of 
a ‘social subject’ who had a high 
participation potential but was 
trapped in an institutional arrange­
m ent that frustrated the accumulat­
ed political energy. By the 1990s, 
Cuban society had experienced radi­
cal changes. The most noteworthy 
included: substantial increases in 
schooling levels; the entry into pub­
lic life of new generations whose 
socialization process differed 
markedly from previous ones; the 
incorporation of a highly qualified, 
technical and professional female 
workforce; notable increases in 
urbanization; and an intense 
process of politization and political 
m aturation. Moreover, nearly one- 
third of the voting age population 
was born  after 1959; nearly two- 
fifths of the labor force was female; 
and almost one million persons had 
com pleted university and technical 
studies and were professionally
employed in production, service, 
and public adm inistration sectors.
In short, Cuban society had under­
gone a process of “autonom ization” 
which was evident in the expression 
of positions that sometimes conflict­
ed with official dictates. Also, there 
has been an em ergence of new eco­
nomic actors (e.g., entrepreneurial 
technocrats linked to the world mar­
ket and self-employed workers) 
whose medium- and long-term 
interests are not necessarily com pat­
ible with the socialist project— 
future political tensions could arise.
Beginning in 1993, these changes 
were anchored to the course of US- 
Cuba relations. The Clinton adm in­
istration’s decision to modify tradi­
tional immigration policy regarding
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Cuban immigrants, its initial inten­
tion to veto the Helms-Burton Bill, 
and the decision to im plement the 
Torricelli Law’s Track Two provision, 
implied a significant change in the 
treatm ent of Cuba. The new policy 
rejected confrontation and became 
one of "bridge building.” If one 
considers seriously rum ors regarding 
the possibility of bolder actions 
toward Cuba during Clinton’s sec­
ond term, the arrival of a period of 
slackening of tensions would sup­
port economic reform and strength­
en Cuban civil society.
T e n  S t e p s  B ack  
Cuban leadership was not oblivi­
ous to the socioeconomic transfor­
mation and its political and ideologi­
cal costs. However, it reacted slowly 
to direct the transformation. It was 
not a coincidence that the reforms 
were delayed despite the fact that 
the economic situation dem anded a 
transformation of the system. Re­
forms were allowed only when the 
crisis reached a point where the gov­
ernm ent was losing the ability to 
govern (as exemplified by the events 
of the Summer of 1994). A bold 
step might have been a policy to 
propose a new development strategy 
based on the requirem ents for eco­
nomic efficiency (including institu­
tional, procedural and normative 
reforms in the political sphere).
One of the conditions to resolve the 
severe economic crisis may be to 
search for some coherence between 
the political and economic spheres. 
The objective would be to resolve 
the contradictions which spring 
from the economic transformation. 
Cuba’s political leadership, however, 
has elected against innovative eco­
nomic change and the introduction 
of political reforms. Instead, it has 
confronted current and future polit­
ical trends with traditional mecha­
nisms. Such a choice is not strange 
to a leadership which has always 
stressed ideological supremacy over 
o ther factors.
The decision to block tolerance 
and autonom ous action—which 
had been allowed in recent years 
because of the Revolution’s internal 
and external weaknesses and less as 
a result of a will for change—was 
taken when the course of US for­
eign policy moved in concert with 
domestic events. In my view, the 
catalyst was the decision on the part 
of dissident groups to form a single 
organization nam ed Concilio Cubano 
and the announcem ent of February 
24, 1996, as the launching date.
The US move toward reconciliation 
was perceived by Cuba’s leadership 
as an assault on its traditional power 
base. In this sense, it is worth not­
ing that the Revolution constructed 
its domestic and international policy 
based on the notion of “fortress 
under siege” which m andated the 
need to protect national security 
and which served to justify political 
intolerance and stringent control 
measures. U nder a nonconfronta­
tion scenario with the U nited States, 
the absence of the traditional pop­
ular mobilization elem ent would 
force Cuba’s leadership to deal with 
a novel political situation. It was 
advantageous for Cuba’s leaders to 
continue living under the tense situ­
ation that has characterized rela­
tions with its northern  neighbor—at 
least until these leaders eliminate 
or control internal political discon­
tent. As a result, the shooting down 
of the two airplanes on February 
24, 1996, was a calculated political 
decision by the Cuban governm ent 
to unravel the Clinton adm inistra­
tion’s intentions to seek closer ties 
with Cuba. The incident also pro­
vided an excuse to flame nationalist 
sentim ent and launch the “ideologi­
cal offensive” Fidel Castro 
announced before the Central 
Committee.
The announcem ent of this offen­
sive signified a regression—ten 
steps back—in the political life of 
the island. In 1986, a Process of 
Rectification was initiated under a
different context; however, it herald­
ed what would occur a decade later. 
The Process of Rectification was 
born with a high ideological con­
tent. Its central argument, to rescue 
“to national," found a fertile ground 
in the popular patriotic sentim ent 
fueled by hostile US postures and by 
the pro-capitalist trends in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Rectification was explained not only 
as the only genuine socialist alterna­
tive (given the capitulation of for­
m er allies), but also as the only 
alternative through which the 
Cuban nation could guarantee its 
survival. Now as then, the argu­
ments of the Cuban government are 
similar.
F u t u r e  P e r spec tiv e  
Cuban events and change are 
always likely to generate controversy 
and a num ber of interpretations. 
This essay has only provided a par­
tial interpretation of the contradic­
tory transformation that unfolded— 
and will continue to unfold in Cuba. 
Many questions remain unanswered; 
perhaps the most relevant is 
whether the events of 1996 will 
abort any possibility of a transition 
on the island.
Given the complexity of the situa­
tion, only a few clues on Cuba’s 
future can be provided which may 
be significant in any scenario. An 
im portant premise must be noted. 
Despite the governm ent’s claims 
that measures aimed at combating 
the crisis are temporary, these have 
defined, and will continue to 
define, a Cuban reality that will be 
difficult to revert.
In the short- and medium-term, 
progress will depend on three dis­
tinct factors: the form that the 
m uch announced ideological offen­
sive will take; the economic results 
obtained in 1996, especially the 
sugar harvest; and the policy that 
the reelected Clinton administra­
tion adopts in the near future 
toward Cuba. ■
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C u ba n  R esearch  In s t it u t e
F L O R I D A  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  U N I V E R S I T Y
presents
T he First C R I C onference o n  C u b a n  a n d  C u b a n -A m e r ic a n  Stu d ies
October 9 -11,1997
CALL FOR PAPERS
The Cuban Research Institute (CRI) of Florida International University invites all those per­
sons engaged in Cuban or Cuban-American Studies to participate in the CRI's first general 
conference, to be held at the FIU campus October 9-11,1997.
We encourage the submission of proposals for papers, panels, and roundtables in all areas 
o f intellectual inquiry relevant to an understanding o f the history, culture, society, and cre­
ative expressions of the Cuban nation. Through this conference, the CRI seeks to convene 
a broad gathering that bridges geographic, generational, ideological, and disciplinary 
boundaries.
The fo llow ing  areas are meant to be suggestive o f the broad scope of the conference: the 
development of the social, cultural, politica l, and economic institutions of the island dur­
ing the colonial and Republican eras; the antecedents and consequences o f the 
Revolution o f 1959; analysis of the contemporary Cuban reality; manifestations of national 
identity in the arts, literature, and popular culture; migration and the dynamics of Cuban 
communities outside the island; Cuba-U.S. relations; and the importance o f race, class, 
gender, and politica l culture in the development of the Cuban nation, both on the island 
and in its diaspora.
Persons interested in participating should submit a detailed one-page abstract of the paper 
they propose to present. We also accept proposals from those who wish to organize pan­
els and roundtables.
The CRI w ill offer a lim ited number of modest travel grants to graduate students and jun ior 
scholars who would otherwise not be able to attend the conference. Indication of interest 
and need for such support should be submitted w ith  the abstract.
Deadline for the submission o f abstracts is A p ril 30 ,1997 .
For more information or to send your abstract, contact:
Lisandro Perez, Director 
Cuban Research Institute 
DM  363, University Park 
Florida International University 
M iam i, FL 33199
(305) 348-1991/Fax (305) 348-3593 
crinst@servms. fiu.edu
Reports: The Americas
Perspectives on Regional Trade
Thomas M . Leonard
F
our University of N orth 
Florida professors,1 who 
recently com pleted a two- 
year study under the aus­
pices of a grant from the 
United States Departm ent 
of Education, concluded that the 
“opening” of Cuba will have a 
greater impact upon the Caribbean 
community than the North 
American Free Trade Agreem ent 
(NAFTA). Furtherm ore, intrare- 
gional commercial relations are 
more im portant to the South 
American countries than NAFTA.
W hen Congress passed—and 
President William J. Clinton 
signed—the NAFTA agreem ent in 
late 1993, there was widespread 
concern of its potential damage to 
the United States economy. Little 
attention was given in the US to the 
possible impact that NAFTA m ight 
have upon the Caribbean and 
South American countries.
Although the Caribbean Com m un­
ity and Common M arket (CARI- 
COM) established a series of com­
missions to study the issue, the 
Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) countries only start­
ed an examination of NAFTA’s sig­
nificance to the region in 1996.
As part of the project, the team 
visited three CARICOM countries 
(Barbados, Belize and the Domini­
can Republic) and the four MER­
COSUR countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).
With the exception of Argentina, 
the United States embassy staff in
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each country provided the team 
with an introductory briefing on 
the nation’s contem porary econo­
my and politics, followed by inter­
views with personnel in various gov­
ernm ent ministries, private 
research organizations, and mem­
bers of the business sector.
T h e  Ca r ib b e a n  C o m m u n it y
The origins of CARICOM can be 
traced to 1973 when several form er 
British colonies agreed to establish 
a free trade area. Since then CARI­
COM has grown into a regional 
association representing 15 nations 
with the m andate to deal with intra- 
Caribbean and global trade.
The CARICOM nations visited by 
the team were selected because of 
their economic differences: 
Barbados has the best m anaged 
economy in the Caribbean com m u­
nity, Belize seeks to secure its 
future as the most recently inde­
penden t Caribbean nation and, the 
Dominican Republic holds a special 
relationship with the U nited States 
“807” industries. Despite the diver­
sity, each shares com m on concerns 
about its economic future.
Barbados and Belize are form er 
British colonies that profit from 
two im portant legacies: a literate 
population and a functioning 
dem ocratic form of government.
In contrast, the Dominican 
Republic has a Spanish tradition 
and since its independence in 1844 
has been m arred by a series of dic­
tatorships. Each also shares a histo­
ry of governm ent serving elitist 
interests. This legacy has been suc­
cessfully challenged in Barbados 
and is now being challenged in 
Belize and the Dominican 
Republic. Clearly, these traditions
provide guidance for the future, 
and bespeak that Barbados is the 
most confident of the three, Belize 
less so and the Dominican Republic 
the least confident.
Only the Dominican Republic 
anticipates an adverse im pact upon 
its economy as a result of the 
NAFTA accords. The Republic is 
hom e to 17 Free Trade Zones 
where num erous US electric, gar­
m ent and pharm aceutical plants 
operate under “807” status. 
According to this arrangem ent, 
parts are shipped to the Dominican 
Republic for assembly and re tu rned  
to the US duty-free or near so.
With NAFTA, Dominican officials 
expect that there will be no future 
expansion of these operations, but 
ra ther that new US investments in 
assembly plants will go to Mexico 
where wages and transportation 
costs are m uch lower. The 
Barbadian governm ent does not 
share the Dom inicans’ concern 
because it views NAFTA as address­
ing an economy of the past.
Instead, Barbados anticipates that 
its future rests no t with m anufactur­
ing but with informatics, telecom ­
m unications and offshore financial 
services. Belizean officials do not 
anticipate that NAFTA will have an 
adverse im pact upon its economy, 
save for the trucking industry 
which delivers goods from the 
w harf at Belize City to businesses in 
the Yucatan region of southern 
Mexico and the western border of 
Guatemala. Otherwise, m ore press­
ing needs lay in agricultural devel­
opm ent (to cut the im portation of 
foodstuffs) and the developm ent of 
a labor force to m eet the needs of 
light industrial production and an 
expanded tourist industry.
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CARICOM, MERCOSUR and NAFTA revisited
The proposed Graham-Gibbons 
Bill in the U nited States Congress 
does no t excite spokespersons in 
all th ree countries. This bill offers 
to extend NAFTA’s trade agree­
m ents to the Caribbean com m uni­
ty, bu t with the potential dem and 
for prelim inary agreem ents on 
intellectual property rights, govern­
m ent p rocurem ent policies and 
offshore banking, allegations have 
arisen of US in terference in the 
in ternal affairs of o ther nations.
If NAFTA does no t arouse m uch 
interest in these countries, the 
anticipated “open ing” o f Cuba 
does. All th ree advocate the lifting 
o f the US em bargo against Cuba, 
viewing the em bargo as an 
im m oral act that contributes to the 
suffering of the Cuban people 
w ithout bringing political change 
to the island. Despite this position, 
two countries—the Dom inican 
Republic and Belize—admittedly 
stand to lose should Cuba “open 
u p .” Both the Dominicans and the 
Belizeans anticipate a loss for the 
tourist industries. Curiosity would 
cause visitors to flock to Cuba 
despite the Dom inican R epublic’s 
well-established tourist industry 
and Belize’s special place on the 
Mundo Maya route. The Dom ini­
cans and Belizeans also fear 
Cuban com petition in citrus and 
sugar exports and for dollar invest­
m ent. (The Dom inican R epublic’s 
tobacco industry m ight also be 
jeopardized.) In contrast, the 
Barbadians stand m uch m ore con­
fidently since they anticipate an 
increase in tourism  because their 
location at the far end of the 
Caribbean will no t be lost to cruise 
ships stopping at Cuba. 
F urtherm ore, in anticipating a
future in electronic service indus­
tries, Cuba will not be a com peti­
tor.
T h e  S o u t h e r n  C o n e
MERCOSUR em braces four 
southern  cone countries— 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay—and has as its goal the 
elim ination of trade barriers 
am ong the m em ber countries.
The econom ies of these countries 
are diverse and at various stages of 
developm ent, with Brazil being the 
richest, followed by A rgentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay. Politically, 
these countries share the experi­
ence o f shedding m ilitary rule and 
re tu rn ing  to democracy in the 
1980s. In fact, Paraguay’s dem oc­
racy was reaffirm ed ju st two days 
prior to the team ’s arrival in 
Asuncion, when an attem pted mili­
tary coup was squelched u n d er US 
pressure.
The NAFTA agreem ent is n o t a 
m ajor issue for any o f these coun­
tries. Instead, officials criticized 
the US for its lack of consistent 
policy toward the southern  hem i­
sphere. In fact, interest in this 
region was reignited late in 
President George Bush’s adm inis­
tration after a ten-year lapse. 
Reaching an agreem ent with the 
US will be difficult. Like their 
CARICOM counterparts, the MER­
COSUR countries are wary of 
W ashington’s insistence on prelim i­
nary agreem ents dealing with intel­
lectual property rights, p rocure­
m ent and the environm ent. Each 
is also critical of US tariff protec­
tion for selected industries and of 
the maze of red  tape that confronts 
businesspersons seeking access to 
the US market.
While acknowledging the influen­
tial economic power of the U nited 
States, spokespersons in each 
nation em brace the Brazilian pro­
posal to unite all South America 
into one trading partnership 
before dealing with NAFTA and the 
United States. Each also accepts 
the “four plus o n e” concept w here­
by individual MERCOSUR coun­
tries would conclude agreem ents 
with o ther Latin American 
republics. Bolivia and Chile jo ined  
MERCOSLTR in mid-1996 on an 
associate status. Efforts to expand 
MERCOSUR now include 
Venezuela, with the ultim ate objec­
tive of uniting MERCOSUR with 
the A ndean Community, CARI­
COM and CACM nations.
If the Andean nations are looked 
upon favorably as trading partners, 
Chile is viewed with suspicion and 
awe. C hile’s failure to en ter 
NAFTA was placed at the Mexican 
‘doorstep’ because Mexico feared 
the loss o f its prim ary position as 
an extension of the US economy. 
The decision prom pted the 
Chilean governm ent to look toward 
MERCOSUR. Most believe that 
Chile will want to protect its eco­
nom ic advances of the past ten 
years. Yet, Paraguayans view C hile’s 
participation in MERCOSUR as a 
counterw eight to A rgentina and 
Brazil. Spokespersons in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, and Bahia 
Blanca, Argentina, are hopeful that 
a trans-Andean transportation sys­
tem would link those po rt cities 
with Concepcion, Chile, thus pro­
viding the east coast cities with the 
economic benefits that would come 
from the commercial linkage 
between the eastern and western 
hem ispheres.
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O ne US official described MER­
COSUR as a stormy Latin 
American m arriage, and indeed it 
is. No one denies that Brazil is 
MERCOSLTR’s engine and that the 
future of the southern  cone rests 
upon Brazil’s economic health. Yet 
nationalistic jealousies persist. 
A rgentines express eternal opti­
mism that they will catch up with 
the Brazilians—a gam e-point score 
that the latter will no t permit. 
Meanwhile, the Paraguayans are 
tired of being treated  like a “step­
son” by their larger neighbors.
Only the Uruguayans seem 
resigned to their secondary status 
and, by staying ou t of the fracas, 
hope to become hom e to 
MERCOSUR's secretariat.
Beyond nationalistic rivalries, 
MERCOSUR confronts several 
problem s, the most contentious 
being the com m on external tariff. 
Each nation wants to protect partic­
ular industries, such as automobiles 
and com puter software, from out­
side com petition. There is also a 
need  to harm onize labor, tax and 
investm ent laws, a difficult task 
because of the varied im pact that 
harm onization would have upon 
each nation. Admittedly, Paraguay 
and Uruguay do not have the funds 
to develop the infrastructure neces­
sary to play a significant role in 
com m erce, prom pting a fear of 
being left behind. And while intra- 
MERCOSLiR trade has flourished, 
each nation continues to ru n  an 
overall trade deficit, which may 
lead to agreem ents outside MER­
COSUR. For example, the 
Brazilians hope to reach an accord 
with China on agricultural goods 
and Paraguay hopes to find a spe­
cial niche in the Chilean m arket 
for processed meats and toiletries.
Socioeconomic segments within 
each country face problem s that 
may no t be MERCOSUR driven, 
but which will im pact upon future 
econom ic cooperation. All govern­
m ent spokespersons dismissed as
an “interesting concept” the sug­
gestion that the contem porary rush 
toward privatization of state-owned 
industries parallels the actions of 
the late nineteenth-century  Latin 
American liberals that resulted in 
h igher prices and lower wages at 
hom e while profits were sent 
abroad. O ne US embassy official 
dismissed this suggestion with the 
observation that any change is 
described as neoliberal. But to the 
person on the street, h igher prices 
and lost jobs are real and h is /h e r 
consternation is vocally expressed 
on the streets of Buenos Aires and 
M ontevideo. Opposition to m od­
ernization in Paraguay comes from 
the traditional landed elite and 
nearly 200,000 small farm ers and 
state employees who fear that the 
n a tion ’s favorable investm ent laws 
and privatization plans will cost 
them  dearly. Brazil’s older indus­
trial class in Sao Paulo and resi­
dents in the economically underde­
veloped northeast region oppose 
integration, while the m ilitary is 
wary of any in ternational agree­
m ent that deals with telecom m uni­
cations.
Despite these obstacles, there is 
agreem ent in all four capitals that 
the progress made in MERCOSLTR 
surpasses that of the European
U nion at the same point in devel­
opm ent and that all parties are 
com m itted to continued economic 
cooperation.
I m p l ic a t io n s  f o r  t h e  U n it e d  S tates  
While the benefits of NAFTA 
continue to be debated in the 
U nited States, this study concludes 
that the agreem ent has little signifi­
cance to the Caribbean and south­
ern  cone nations, save the 
Dom inican Republic. Instead, offi­
cials in the CARICOM and MER­
COSLTR com m unities link their 
na tion ’s future economic develop­
m ent to domestic and regional 
issues, no t to decisions m ade in 
Washington. In reality, however, 
such positions may be sheer folly 
because Caribbean trade is closely 
tied to the LTnited States. In the 
southern cone, Brazil’s effort to 
lead a South American consortium  
to challenge US economic power is 
purely an admission of economic 
weakness. ■
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Project Amazonas, Inc.
A  Non-Profit Organization Dedicated to the Protection of 
the Peruvian Tropical Rain Forest and Provision of Medical 
Services to its Native People
Our Objectives
T h e objectives o f P roject A m azonas are to  p ro m o te , coord ina te , a n d /o r  initi­
ate hum an itarian , research , sustainable developm ent, conservation, an d  ed u ­
cational activities in th e  A m azon reg ion  o f  the  R epublic o f  Peru .
Humanitarian Activities
P roject A m azonas is actively w orking to b rin g  regu lar m o d e rn  h ea lth  care an d  
education  to the  inhab itan ts  o f  rem o te  areas. T h e  P roject coord ina tes the  
sh ip m en t o f m edical supplies an d  eq u ip m en t to hospitals an d  clinics, provides 
rem o te  areas with basic m edical kits, an d  establishes tra in ing  p rogram s fo r vil­
lage h ea lth  workers. In add ition , the  p ro jec t coo rd ina tes the  activities o f  for­
eign h ea lth  professionals who are d o n a tin g  th e ir tim e an d  expertise.
Research and Conservation
Project A m azonas has established two biological research  stations an d  forest 
p reserves on  th e  Rio O rosa fo r use by scientist, education  groups, an d  eco- 
tourists. T hese field sites have ho sted  g roups w hose research  has resu lted  in 
significant discoveries o f  new species an d  h ab ita t range. T h e  P roject en co u r­
ages the  conservation  o f resources by ru ra l com m unities to en su re  th a t stocks 
are n o t d ep le ted  by overexploitation.
Sustainable Development
Project Am azonas p rom otes sustainable deve lopm en t projects, such as trad i­
tional crafts, non-destructive tim b er harvesting, butterfly  farm ing , an d  trop i­
cal fish exporting . Local p eo p le  are  en co u rag ed  to rem ain  in th e ir com m u­
nities an d  take an  active ro le  in th e  m an ag em en t o f  forest resources.
Education
T h e facilities o f  P roject A m azonas have b een  used  by educational g roups as 
p a r t o f  p rogram s th a t teach  ab o u t the  complexity, im p o rtan ce  an d  beauty o f 
tropical ecosystems, an d  ab o u t the  im p o rtan ce  o f  p eo p le  who live in  these sys­
tem s to  th e ir m an ag em en t an d  conservation. T h e  Pro ject encourages in te r­
action  an d  com m unication  betw een local p eo p le  an d  national an d  in te rn a­
tional educational groups.
Become Involved with Us!
F or add itional in fo rm ation , to  in q u ire  ab o u t research , m edical, educational 
o r  tourism  o p p o rtu n itie s  a t o u r facilities, o r to  m ake a d o n a tio n  o f  tim e, m ate­
rials o r funds, please con tac t us at:
Project Amazonas, Inc.,
701 E. C om m ercial Blvd., #200, Ft. L auderdale , F lorida 33334, 
T el/F ax: (954) 764-8274, website: h ttp ://w w w .co n ten tp a rk .co m /am azo n as
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Unearthing Grassroots Power
Eduardo Silva
Under the assumption that forests are multiple use zones 
that can and do provide their inhabitants with a living, the 
grassroots development approach promotes agroforestry, 
community forestry and reforestation, wood harvesting, the 
ranching of native fauna, extractive reserves, and ecotourism.
T
he fate of tropical 
forests has captured the 
imagination of the 
world for over a 
decade. Many studies 
have diagnosed the 
proximate and deeper causes of 
deforestation and sketched out poli­
cy proposals to stem, halt, or reverse 
the process. In this debate, the 
“shifted cultivator”—the poor, land- 
hungry people who invade the 
forests in search of subsistence liv­
ing—often bears the b run t of the 
blame. Because dem ographic pres­
sure and maldistribution of agricul­
tural land throw these people onto 
the frontier in large numbers, policy 
prescriptions focus on family plan­
ning, halting colonization projects 
and road-building, and advocating 
land reform, all the while stressing 
the need for parks and reserves, 
and the capacity to manage them. 
This policy preference is often inter­
preted as an attem pt to keep people 
from the forest in order to preserve 
it. As laudable as those goals are, 
serious questions remain. What will 
be the fate of people who inhabit 
the forest? Are they to be driven 
out? Are they to be blamed for 
deforestation as they seek to survive?
For some time, poverty has been 
perceived as a major contributor to 
environmental degradation, espe­
cially in rural areas. Consequently, 
in the latter half of the 1980s, the 
United Nations World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 
the Brundtiand Commission,
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focused on basic needs as a neces­
sary com ponent of sustainable 
development, in tandem  with a redi­
rection of economic growth along a 
more environmentally friendly path, 
population control, and citizen par­
ticipation. How to balance econom ­
ic growth, environmental quality, 
social equality, and participation 
remains a complex policy issue.
In forest policy, the grassroots 
development approach most direct­
ly addresses the livelihood concerns 
of economically and socially under­
privileged forest dwellers. U nder 
the assumption that forests are mul­
tiple use zones that can and do pro­
vide their inhabitants with a living, 
this approach prom otes agro­
forestry, community forestry and 
reforestation, wood harvesting, the 
ranching of native fauna, extractive 
reserves, and ecotourism. Policies 
and projects based on this approach 
prom ote the conservation of forests 
at the community level. These poli­
cies encourage local self-reliance 
and control of economic resources, 
the use of appropriate technologies 
that mimic natural processes and 
emphasize the linkage of com m uni­
ties to markets.
G r a s s r o o t s  D e v e l o p m e n t  P o l it ic s
The experiences of Mexico, Costa 
Rica, and Brazil over the past 15
years provide some insights into the 
politics of crafting policies and pro­
jects that prom ote grassroots devel­
opm ent in the forest sector. In the 
1980s, Mexico prom oted com m uni­
ty forestry am ong forest ejidos (com­
munal farms that arose as a result of 
the Mexican revolution). Based on 
sound silvicultural practices, these 
grassroots development models 
show how communities organize to 
sustainably harvest forests, build 
hum an capital, provide employment 
at better wages, and generate, rein­
vest, and distribute profits to the 
community. Costa Rica developed a 
robust community reforestation pro­
gram in the Pacific northwest. In 
accordance with a land tenure sys­
tem based on private property 
rights, family farmers belonging to 
cooperatives avail themselves of gov­
ernm ent incentives to reforest with 
native or exotic species. The coop­
erative mediates between the gov­
ernm ent and the farmers and pro­
vides members with technical and 
financial support. These cases show 
that community forestry is feasible 
under both communal and individ­
ual forms of land tenure rights.
With the creation of extractive 
reserves—and a com m itm ent to 
legalize Indian land claims—Brazil 
offers a case of explicit recognition 
of forests as multiple use zones,
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Given the difficulties of grassroots development, the 
tide has turned against this approach as a solution to 
the livelihood question for forest dwellers.
stressing its nontim ber services: 
nuts, rubber, fibers, and other agri­
cultural products.
U nderstanding the politics that 
influenced the movement toward 
grassroots development in forestry 
requires analyzing actors, interests, 
and power in the context of eco­
nomically and culturally defined 
social groups, state institutions and 
actors, and external factors. These, 
however, are only the essential 
building blocks; the dynamics of 
coalition building between these 
elem ents lies at the heart of the pol­
itics involved. The aggregation of 
the capabilities of the different 
actors constitutes the coalition’s 
power.
What kinds of pro-grassroots 
developm ent coalitions have been 
successful? The Mexican and Costa 
Rican cases suggest one path. 
Favorable outcomes in those cases 
depended on the formation of coali­
tions between organized communi­
ties and state and international 
actors that supported grassroots 
development. Two elements were 
crucial to the success of the coali­
tions. First, the communities were 
actively seeking help to either 
reverse an abrupt economic decline 
or to counter socioeconomically 
advantaged groups with whom they 
were locked in a struggle over natur­
al resources. Second, relevant state 
institutions were sympathetic to 
grassroots development from the 
outset. In contrast, the Brazilian 
case exemplified coalition building 
in the absence of state support for 
grassroots development. Domestic 
social and ecological groups 
required strong support from inter­
national actors—US environmental 
pressure groups persuaded the 
Congress of the United States to 
threaten Brazil with blockage of 
World Bank loans.
These cases demonstrate that 
organized communities seeking to 
overcome a specific difficulty are the 
bedrock of grassroots development
coalitions. Such communities active­
ly seek allies to help solve their prob­
lems and have a vital interest in 
implementing proposed solutions. 
State actors (whenever available) 
play crucial roles in these coalitions; 
they can protect peasant and indige­
nous leaders from their enemies. 
Together with nongovernmental 
organizations and international 
actors sympathetic to grassroots 
development, state actors can also 
provide technical expertise, exten­
sion services, and funds. But only 
organized communities will be able to 
use these to best avail. If communi­
ties are not organized, community 
forestry projects should make orga­
nization the first priority. Wherever 
possible, such efforts should build 
on existing grassroots organizations 
even if they have little or no experi­
ence in forestry. Otherwise, compe­
tition between new and old groups 
can virtually ruin any project.
Grassroots development is diffi­
cult. It can be costly in terms of time 
(easily up to 10 years worth of pro­
ject com m itm ent). This type of 
development is capital intensive, 
especially in terms of hum an capital 
(technical expertise), extension ser­
vices, and financial support. More­
over, grassroots development 
requires great flexibility. It can also 
be politically costly because support 
for socioeconomic underprivileged 
groups can generate powerful ene­
mies.
Given these difficulties, the tide 
has turned against grassroots devel­
opm ent as a solution to the liveli­
hood question for forest dwellers. 
The reflux is rooted in the desperate 
need of governments to generate 
export commodities to repay crush­
ing foreign debt loans, the concomi­
tant bankruptcy of states, and the 
emphasis on orthodox market eco­
nomics and biodiversity. In this con­
text, arguments for large-scale indus­
trial logging or tree plantations to 
generate foreign exchange through 
exports and direct foreign invest­
m ent are gaining popularity. 
Moreover, grassroots development 
has taken a back seat to a focus on 
parks and reserves as a means to 
conserve biodiversity in many multi­
lateral institutions and international 
organizations.
T ow ard  a  N ew  C o n se r v a t io n ism
Although policies that promote 
large-scale timber industries are gen­
erally at odds with grassroots devel­
opment, the same is not true of con­
servation. A “new conservationism” 
is emerging. This philosophy recog­
nizes that the viability of parks and 
reserves depends in no small mea­
sure on their ability to offer solutions 
to the livelihood issues that bedevil 
impoverished rural populations.
The application of grassroots devel- 
opment-style projects in buffer zones 
should reduce pressure to exploit 
the core areas of parks or reserves 
that contain essential habitats.
The utility of the buffer zone con­
cept for development purposes may 
depend on whether it is narrowly or 
broadly interpreted. If reduced to 
areas immediately surrounding a 
park or reserve, a buffer zone may 
be of limited utility. The num bers 
of families and the area covered 
would be severely restricted.
Success may draw families from the 
rest of the country where farmers 
and peasants are being subjected to 
bankruptcy and expulsion as the 
economics of agriculture concen­
trates land in the hands of agribusi­
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ness. U nder these conditions, the 
defense of gains by those who bene­
fit front grassroots developm ent 
projects in a buffer zone could lead 
to either social tension, land inva­
sions of protected areas, or both. A 
broader conceptualization of parks 
and reserves as integral parts of 
“areas of conservation” which are 
linked to each o ther m ight offer 
better chances of success—Costa 
Rica is currently experim enting 
with variations of this idea. 
Theoretically, areas of conservation 
distribute grassroots development- 
oriented projects m ore broadly 
across the country and cover many 
activities, such as watershed m an­
agement, integrated small-scale 
agriculture, forestry, reforestation, 
and extractive activities.
While the “new conservationism ” 
offers the prospect of integrating 
grassroots developm ent with biodi­
versity protection, the extent to 
which this promise becomes reality 
also depends on politics. The fund­
ing for such efforts, and their con­
ceptualization, lies mostly in the 
hands of m ultilateral lending orga­
nizations and conservationist non­
governm ental organizations in the 
developed nations, especially the 
U nited States. The apprehension 
of grassroots developm ent-oriented 
groups in developing countries is 
that these in ternational actors— 
and their domestic sources of sup­
port—are dom inated by persons 
primarily concerned with habitat 
protection. Thus, all too often, the 
obligatory com m unity developm ent 
com ponent of project g rant com pe­
titions is poorly conceived, under­
funded, and excessively limited in 
its reach. In short, the community 
developm ent portion of the project 
runs the risk of being stillborn. In 
o ther proposals, such as jo in t 
im plem entation of carbon offset 
agreem ents and bioprospecting, 
sharing funds with grassroots devel­
opm ent projects is simply not on 
the agenda.
The “new conservationism” and 
the funds attached to it thus provide 
an opportunity for generating grass­
roots development projects, but we 
must no t assume that intellectual 
recognition and project require­
ments automatically translate into 
action. Given the central role of 
international agencies, converting 
this opportunity into reality may 
involve generating broad coalitions 
similar to the ones that obliged the 
World Bank to make the environ­
m ent a more central concern—and 
that forced the Brazilian govern­
m ent to establish extractive 
reserves. These coalitions would 
necessarily involve international 
nongovernm ental organizations that 
take the nexus between grassroots 
development and environm ent seri­
ously in alliance with forces (peas­
ant organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, unions, and political
parties) within developing coun­
tries. In order to generate support 
for their cause am ong the citizens 
of developed nations who are main­
ly interested in species preservation, 
such coalitions would have to 
dem onstrate that parks and reserves 
cannot survive where hum an popu­
lations live in degradation. A cam­
paign around those themes might 
build pressure—including from the 
US Congress—to pay more serious 
attention to the integration of pro­
jects that sustain “alternative” liveli­
hoods in conjunction with nature 
conservation. This is a difficult task 
and the curren t political winds may 
not favor it. But if the process of 
grassroots mobilization and coali­
tion building is not begun in expec­
tation of more politically propitious 
times, we run the risk of accepting 
rhetoric for reality, the shell for the 
content. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Lather Up with Hemp
California voters gave patients who 
suffer from certain diseases the 
right to smoke m arijuana for m edi­
cinal purposes last November. 
Jam aica had another idea about 
what to do with hem p. In August, 
the ministry of agriculture told 
Reuters that Jam aica would begin 
cultivating industrial hem p on an 
experim ental basis. The hem p 
would be used to produce soaps, 
textiles, animal feed, cosmetics, and 
paper products. The ministry 
claimed that the hem p would not 
contain the psychoactive chemical 
found in marijuana; measures 
would be instituted to prevent any 
tam pering with the industrial vari­
ety. Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey 
had no reaction regarding 
Jam aica’s plan, but the Clinton 
adm inistration has already threat­
ened US physicians who prescribe 
m arijuana with arrest. Might 
Jam aica face decertification?
Expand at Your Own Risk
According to a Kroll Associates 
report, Japanese and o ther foreign 
m ultinational executives have been 
kidnapped by Mexican gangs and 
are likely to face increasing threats 
in the future unless they and their 
com panies are better prepared  to 
check the problem . Three factors 
may account for the increase in for­
eign kidnappings: the kidnappers 
are never caught, the companies 
pay quickly and handsomely, and 
foreign executives are easy tar-
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gets—they are no t protected  by 
the security measures that Mexican 
executives have adopted as a result 
of their own experience. The case 
that pu t this trend  into perspective 
was the August 1996 kidnapping of 
M amoru Konno, president of the 
Sanyo Video C om ponent Corpora­
tion, who was freed by his captors 
after his company paid $2 million 
in ransom. The lam entable situa­
tion at the Japanese embassy in 
Lima, Peru, may reflect another 
twist. A lthough denied by Japanese 
officials, MRTA rebels allegedly 
kept business executives longer 
than others hoping that their com­
panies would disburse hefty ran ­
soms for their release.
How Tough is Tough?
Proponents of the Helms-Burton 
Law have been m aking some noise 
that positive results of the legisla­
tion are already being felt. In early 
Decem ber 1996, the Council of 
Ministers of the European Union 
(EU) adopted a “com m on posi­
tio n ” on European policy for the 
support of democracy in Cuba.
This position had the consensus of 
the 15 m em ber states, including 
Spain, which had subm itted a 
harsher proposal. In the text, the 
EU encouraged the peaceful transi­
tion to dem ocratic pluralism and 
the respect for hum an rights in 
Cuba. The EU rejected coercive 
measures that would, according to 
the Council, worsen the situation 
in Cuba. U nder the term s o f the 
com m on position, the EU and its 
m em ber states agreed to: continue 
the dialogue with Cuban au thori­
ties; continue hum anitarian aid— 
subject to an agreem ent on its dis­
tribution (a Spanish cond ition); 
evaluate the evolution of C uba’s 
domestic policy; and continue eco­
nom ic actions geared toward 
greater openness. Closer relations 
between Cuba and the EU will now 
depend  on the Cuban govern­
m en t’s willingness to introduce 
political reforms. The US State 
D epartm ent com m ended the EU 
for its “tougher” stance and sug­
gested that the White House m ight 
consider waiving penalties against 
European firms that do business on 
the island.
A  Madman in Love
The transition to democracy in 
Latin America brought with it a 
long dry spell of Latin American 
presidents who were foreign 
trained, highly sophisticated, and 
perhaps a bit too boring. In 1996, 
however, the swearing in of Abdala 
Bucaram as president of Ecuador 
has provided a good dose of en ter­
tainm ent, although no t all 
Ecuadoreans are amused. As is 
now com m on knowledge, one of 
Bucaram 's first activities as presi­
dent was to record a CD— “A Mad­
m an in Love”—with Los Iracundos, 
a 1970s Uruguayan pop group. As 
if taping the CD were no t enough, 
sources present at the Tenth 
Iberoam erican Summit in Santiago 
report that Bucaram personally 
gave copies of the CD to any 
Iberoam erican president who 
would take one. If you are interest­
ed in listening to the singing presi­
dent, the St. Petersburg Times allows 
you to dial in to get a small sample. 
Dial (813) 898-0019 and select the 
category code 1051. Frank Sinatra, 
he is not.
F I L E
A  Ghost from the Past
W hen President Caldera took 
office in 1993, the centerpiece of 
his campaign was to end co rru p ­
tion in Venezuela. His call went 
over very well and became one of 
the most significant pillars of the 
Summit of the Americas held in 
Miami in 1994 and the basis of a 
region-wide pledge to fight co rrup ­
tion. The sincerity o f Caldera’s 
campaign, however, was questioned 
in an article by Edward Epstein in 
the New Yorker (Septem ber 23) 
which claims that the late Arm and 
H am m er paid $3 million in bribes 
to top governm ent officials of 
Caldera’s first governm ent in 1971 
to secure oil rights for Occidental 
Petroleum . Apparently H am m er 
recorded the conversations with 
Venezuelan governm ent officials.
In 1976, President Carlos Andres 
Perez paid $40 million in com pen­
sation after his governm ent nation­
alized the oil sector. Caldera may 
be suffering from a bad case of 
born-again transparency.
It Is Never Too Late
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, one of 
the Cali C artel’s principal leaders 
(who has been serving time in 
Bogota’s La Picota prison) has 
decided that he will use his spare 
time to obtain a degree in business 
adm inistration. According to 
Semana (Septem ber 23), Rodriguez 
paid 90 thousand pesos for a dis­
tance learning course from the 
Universidad del Sur. His guards at 
La Picota report that the diligent 
student spends several hours a day 
on his new project. State 
D epartm ent officials have stated
that Rodriguez spends the rest of 
his time m anaging the old business­
es he left beh ind  in Cali—old 
habits die hard.
Cat on a Hot Tin R oof
Six years after being credited with 
rescuing A rgentina’s economy from 
the brink o f chaos, form er Minister 
of Economy Domingo Cavallo has 
em barked on a campaign that has 
President M enem and his support­
ers angry. Cavallo has m ade accu­
sations that a “m afia” operates with 
im punity in Argentina. His calls 
have generated  a great deal of 
attention; the Radicales, m em bers 
of the principal opposition party, 
have called him to testify in 
Congress while the Peronistas have 
gone to the courts to prevent 
Cavallo from speaking out. It is 
unlikely that Cavallo will be sen­
tenced or that he will lose credibili­
ty because o f the confrontation 
with his form er employer. He has 
already m ade a nam e for him self as 
an in ternational consultant. His 
first client is none o ther than 
Abdala Bucaram of Ecuador.
A  Dark Crusade
While the Peruvian governm ent 
bragged about the dism antling of 
the MRTA, the guerilla group was 
apparently busy expanding its 
in ternational network. As early as 
1993, Nestor Cerpa, the leader of 
the group that took over the 
Japanese embassy in Lima, was busy 
orchestrating kidnappings in 
Bolivia. Sources close to the 
Bolivian governm ent claim that the 
MRTA, or groups linked to this 
organization, carried out a num ber
of kidnappings before the 
November 1995 abduction of 
Samuel Doria M edina, the en tre­
p reneur whose family paid over $1 
million in ransom. The Bolivian 
governm ent confirm ed in late 
Decem ber that Cerpa and his 
group moved in and out of the 
country using falsified docum ents. 
The war chest that MRTA accum u­
lated to carry ou t the Japanese 
embassy assault was the product of 
a num ber of ransoms paid by 
prom inent Bolivian and Peruvian 
families for the liberation o f their 
relatives.
Honduran Virtual Reality
The H onduran  army announced in 
late Decem ber 1996 that it was 
stripping Colonel Jose Guadalupe 
Reittel Caballero of his title as mili­
tary attache in Mexico and confin­
ing him to house arrest in 
Tegucigalpa. It appears that the 
intrepid Colonel has written a 
paper entitled “El Inform e 2000: 
una realidad virtual de las fuerzas 
arm adas de H onduras” which, 
am ong o ther factors, states that the 
army is destined to disappear, just 
like dinosaurs, because of growing 
in ternal corruption. The report 
notes that the chief of the army 
runs the institution as though it 
were a private hacienda and that 
“while the generals use military 
ships and boats to im port Italian 
ceramics and sum ptuous lamps for 
their mansions, the officers subsist 
with low salaries.” The H onduran 
army is taking these charges seri­
ously. Spokesperson Colonel Mario 
David Villanueva claimed that 
“Reittel Caballero is lying... and will 
be punished for his crim e.” ■
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three 33
f e a t
The Last Hurrah
G a ry  B rana-Shute
Elections in Suriname 1987-1996
Party 1987 1991 1996
New Front 40 30 24
NDP 3 12 16
DA '91 X 9' 4
Pendawalima 4 2" 4
Alliantie X X 3
Party for the Development 
of the Interior(ABOP) X X 0
Progressive Workers and 
Farmers Party (PALU) 4 X X
9 in four-member coalition 2 in coalition with DA ’91
N
ewspapers in the 
United States and, 
especially, the 
Netherlands, trum ­
peted the May 1996 
victory of the multi­
ethnic New Front over form er mili­
tary com m ander and one-time dic­
tator Desi Bouterse’s National 
Democratic Front (NDP) as 
Surinam e’s conclusive re turn  to and 
preference for “democracy.” The 
forces of evil—not to m ention abun­
dant patronage—were held at bay.
The victory was a slim one. 
Composed of the Afro-Creole 
Suriname National Party (NPS), the 
East Indian Progressive Reform 
Party (VHP), the Javanese Party of 
National Unity and Harmony 
(KTPI), and a small Creole-domi­
nated labor party, the Suriname 
Labor Party (SPA), the delicately 
balanced New Front coalition 
scored 24 of the 51 National 
Assembly seats. The statist NDP, 
headed by Desi Bouterse since his 
removal as Commander-in-Chief of 
the military in 1992, weighed in 
with 16 seats. The Democratic 
Alternative (DA) '91, comprised of 
m ultiethnic yuppies, got four; 
Pendawalima, a Javanese splinter 
party, surprised all and copped four; 
while Alliantie, a breakaway group 
from the NDP, won a modest three. 
Less than 60 percent of the elec­
torate tu rned  out.
Gary Brana-Shute teaches Anthropology 
at the George Washington University 
and the Catholic University of America, 
and Caribbean Studies at the Foreign 
Service Institute. He was a 1991 and 
1996 OAS election monitor in 
Suriname.
O ur first revelation is that no one 
party has a majority to form a gov­
ernm ent in Surinam e’s parliamen­
tary system. Eugenia Charles’s warn­
ing resonates— “Coalitions don't 
work in the Caribbean.” Second, in 
the context of Surinam e’s arcane 
laws, the Speaker of the Assembly (a 
post long-held by Jagarnath 
Lachmon, octogenarian leader of 
the VHP), requires a majority vote 
(26) of the Assembly—which he 
barely received in late July. Both the 
President and the Vice President of 
the Republic must be elected by the 
National Assembly with a two-thirds 
majority vote (34). If the majority 
vote is not achieved, the selection 
process is thrown into a nationwide 
forum of local, district, and national­
ly elected officials, num bering 869 
participants (51 national parliamen­
tarians, 106 district representatives, 
and 712 subdistrict officials). This 
setback occurred in 1991 and it took 
five months to seat an executive.
Electoral results since the first post­
dictatorship elections in 1987 have 
shown a marked decline in the for­
tunes of the (New) Front.
I will spare the reader the intrica­
cies, betrayals, personality spats, and 
policy disputes which culminated in 
party breakups, realignments, and 
the emergence of new coalitions.
The salient point is that in Suri­
name, the opposition outnum bers 
the New Front by 27 to 24 and the 
New Front is compelled to make a 
coalition government. Meanwhile, 
the successes of the NDP have grown 
consistently and dramatically since 
its first post-dictatorship run at the 
polls—when the NDP clearly was the 
political arm of the military. In fact, 
the NDP’s gain from 1991 to 1996 is 
greater than the apparent four seats 
since two members of the NDP 
broke away to form Alliantie, thus 
making the absolute gain of the 
NDP leap from a real base of 10 to 
16.
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The end of ethnic politics in Suriname
T h e  D e c l in e  o f  t h e  N ew  F r o n t
How then do we account for the 
continuing decline of the m ultieth­
nic New Front, the surge in 
strength of the NDP, and the ongo­
ing social and economic problem s 
which plague Surinam e’s “race to 
nationhood over ethnic terra in ,” as 
Brakette Williams snappily sums up 
the conundrum ?
In describing Suriname, tourist 
brochures use words and phrases 
such as luscious, fecund, a tropical 
paradise, and a veritable U nited 
Nations with each ethnic g roup’s 
bountiful hospitality surpassing the 
other. This codification was never 
true. With yearly visits, I have seen 
a nation grow desperate, cynical, 
anxious, and hostile. The urban 
proletariat is impoverished, the 
middle class lives on the edge of 
bankruptcy, and youth are disen­
franchised and have given up on 
the neocolonial politics of the old 
Fronters and their grey-beard sup­
porters. Revenues from narcotics 
transshipping and money launder­
ing flow through the country’s 
veins—keeping it alive—together 
with wildcat gold m ining along the 
Litani and M aroni Rivers, and 
uncontrolled tim ber cutting in 
Surinam e’s vast jungle interior. By 
the way, it takes about US$ 18 mil­
lion per m onth to keep Suriname 
runn ing  (the country is the size of 
the state of Georgia and has a pop­
ulation of approxim ately 400,000). 
Dutch aid, held up after the abuses 
of the 1980s, looms like an obses­
sion; yet Suriname ignores the strict 
measures of a structural adjustm ent 
plan recom m ended by every out­
side donor and government. The 
Front/N ew  Front governm ents of 
1987 and 1991 (the form er
deposed by a “telephone” coup in 
1990) have no t proven themselves 
up to the jo b  and have evidenced a 
m arked inability to govern under 
stress. The country, especially the 
young, want a “strong” man or at 
least a fresh start from the old eth­
nic parties, elite cartels, and conso- 
ciational deal making.
Desire Delano Bouterse, fifty 
years old, form er military com m an­
der, de facto head of governm ent 
during the 1980s, head of the NDP 
(although not a candidate for 
office) and renowned as a doe-man 
ra ther than a taki-man (a doer 
rather than a talker) is the richest 
m an in Suriname. Bouterse 
amassed his fortune, converted it 
into political capital, galvanized the 
aspirations of his new supporters, 
and positioned him self as leader of 
a very powerful opposition—almost 
rehabilitating him self from alleged 
m urderer to politician.
NDP's slogan leti a faya (light the 
fire) appeared all over Paramaribo 
and the poorer, Creole neighbor­
hoods. NDP planners had targeted 
youth as long ago as the 1987 elec­
tions and m arketed their now aging 
leadership as young(er), vital, and 
class ra ther than ethnic-oriented 
(the 1970s slogan “socialism is love” 
is alive and well in Surinam e). The 
NDP pitched a class-based national­
ism and played on anticolonial 
resentm ent and the energetic—but 
half-baked—aspirations of frustrat­
ed youth. At one mass meeting, 
the young swooned over Desi’s 
thundering call for “order, disci­
pline, and organization” and for a 
m om ent it was as if one was living 
in Maurice Bishop’s Grenada. One 
extra seat was picked up in 
Paramaribo.
The jungle interior, inhabited by 
Maroons and Amerindians, proved 
to be the NDP’s richest harvest.
The districts of Para, Marowijne, 
Brokopondo, and Sipaliwina togeth­
er make 13 seats, of which the NDP 
won seven, up from three in 1991. 
All of Surinam e’s Amerindians 
voted NDP as did more than half of 
the Maroons, both groups fed up 
with the Front's ineffectiveness dur­
ing and after the civil war of the late 
1980s. The NDP spent fortunes in 
the bush, gave away chain saws, 
arranged small-scale timber and 
gold contracts and concessions, and 
dispensed cash. As one Djuka 
Maroon said at the Dritabikki 
polling station: "We walk with hun­
gry bellies and the NDP puts rice in 
them .”
The urban poor and jungle 
dwellers were not the only support­
ers of the NDP. Many intellectuals, 
leaders, and middle-class func­
tionaries swung their votes to NDP. 
“How can any self-respecting 
Surinam er vote for the corrupt, do- 
nothing New Front?” I was repeated­
ly asked by form er Fronters. The 
renegade New Fronters’ complete 
commitment to NDP doctrine— 
nationalistic and a multiethnic polit­
ical party (the only one in 
Surinam e)—was tem pered by only 
one doubt: the lingering presence 
of Desi Bouterse. Although the for­
m er com m ander has shown a credi­
ble effort to redefine himself and 
many say that he is “rehabilitated” 
(after the m urders of 1982 and 
other civil rights abuses), others fear 
that he and the local cocaine-fueled 
“mafia” would take over the country.
If the NDP is strong, why is the 
New Front so weak? In a nutshell, 
the New Front is old, exhausted,
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corrupt, and without a vision. To be 
fair, throughout the late 1970s and 
since 1987 the New Front has kept 
the risk of ethnic conflict low by ven­
turing little beyond politics and the 
consociational convention of distrib­
uting graft and patronage up and 
down and around the ethnic system 
of party favoritism. While patronage 
was given to the East Indians, the 
Creoles, and the Javanese, the 
Maroons and the Amerindians were 
left empty-handed—that is why the 
Front lost the interior in 1996.
Years ago Rosemary Brana-Shute 
wrote about wom en’s political clubs 
in a traditional neighborhood in 
lower class Paramaribo. The women 
had pledged their loyalty to the 
NPS, not based on ideology but 
diepie bri-bii, a “religious belief.”
Those women are all old now, dead 
or have migrated to the 
Netherlands; in fact, virtually the 
entire group supporting the New 
Front is middle aged or older. The 
melodies heard during political ral­
lies brought to the forefront the 
generation gap: the NDP played hip 
hop, reggae, and ragga while, at 
New Front rallies, the only object 
missing was Lawrence Welk’s bubble 
machine.
T h e  E n d  o f  E t h n ic it y
The ethnic strangle hold— 
apan’jit—on Surinam e’s political 
choices has loosened over the years, 
primarily in the aftermath of the rev­
olution, civil war, and the return  of 
the expatriots from the Netherlands 
with their university degrees and 
experiences (and, like Trinidad, 
consisting of an increasingly “mixed 
g roup” of voters). Suriname’s politi­
cal choices have increased dramati­
cally, with six different parties/coali­
tions comprised of 13 separate polit­
ical parties running in 1996. Class 
and ideology have conclusively 
entered the discourse; linkages have 
been made as follows: New Front, 
ethnic-centrist; NDP, multiethnic, 
nationalist-socialist; DA '91, multieth­
nic, business/private sector orient­
ed; Alliantie, similar to NDP’s stance 
but distancing itself from Bouterse 
and the military; Pendawalima, 
Javanese-centrist; and ABOP—a cre­
ation of the form er rebel Ronnie 
Brunswijk—Maroon.
The New Front’s first chore was to 
establish a government and negotia­
tions were going on with DA '91 and 
Pendawalima—the political distance 
between the three parties is not that 
great although the personalities 
heading the parties are all testy. If a 
deal is cut and if it sticks, it would 
yield a majority of 32 seats; enough 
to obtain a government and a speak­
er of the parliament but not a presi­
dent. The three-party coalition 
would actually be comprised of eight 
political parties (New Front—four, 
DA '91—three, and Pendawalima).
You can bet the yuppies in DA '91 
will not want the ancient Jagarnath 
Lachmon as speaker. This tender 
reed of a coalition must then nudge 
its choice of vice president and pres­
ident through an 869 m ember 
national forum. The New Front has 
the local, district, and national sim­
ple majority to advance its candi­
date—probably, once again, the taci­
turn Ronald Venitiaan. This choice 
though would jeopardize its 
National Assembly coalition with the 
two partners who want a more 
dynamic (and a less black national­
ist) leader. Meanwhile, the NDP 
and Alliantie will be probing for 
every weakness in the coalition’s 
arm or and strengthening themselves 
for a snap election—which they have 
publicly said they will work for in 
two to three years. Particularly vul­
nerable are labor unions which have 
become increasingly disenchanted 
with their representation through 
SPA of the New Front. It is claimed 
that the head of SPA, Fred Derby, 
can no longer control nor direct the 
powerful labor constituency.
Will the New Front hold? The 
most often heard cliche is that as the 
economy improves the fortunes of
the party in power will advance. I 
do not see that happening. With 
Surinam e’s ethnic occupational spe­
cialization, the economic improve­
m ent of one ethnic group will occur 
at the relative expense of another. 
Sooner or later, some sort of struc­
tural adjustment program must be 
mounted, the military must be fur­
ther downsized and professionalized, 
and the ram pant crime, corruption, 
and narcotics trafficking must be 
brought under control. (The editor 
of a leading Suriname newspaper 
claims that 50% of GDP circulates as 
drug-related money [rem em ber the 
$18 million?].)
The formalities of Surinam e’s 
democracy have functioned and the 
election of 1996, like 1991 and 1987, 
was open, secret, and without irregu­
larities. Look for another one in 
about two years and keep your eyes 
on the NDP.
P o s t s c r ip t
By early August 1996, parliamen­
tary coalitions had taken shape. Five 
members of the East Indian VHP 
faction of the Front coalition bolted 
from their party, declared them ­
selves VHP 2000, and formed an 
alliance with the NDP. Moreover,
DA '91 and Pendawalima, each with 
four seats, declared themselves the 
“middle block” and tentatively 
agreed to work in coalition with the 
Front. With the Front now down to 
19 seats, its allied strength in parlia­
m ent stood at 27. The NDP was 
able to count on VHP 2000 and 
Alliantie—and a combined force of 
24 seats. Two rounds of presidential 
voting took place in the National 
Assembly and proved inconclusive; 
candidates Venitiaan (Front) and 
Wijdenbosch (NDP) were virtually 
running neck and neck, and nei­
ther obtained the requisite two- 
thirds vote. Thus, the election of a 
president was thrown to the Peoples’ 
Representatives Committees before 
September 8th when the m andate of 
the government expired. Whether
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the Front coalition could hold on 
for even this long was the object of 
intense speculation and all eyes were 
on the KTPI faction of the Front 
(whose members were unhappy with 
the num ber and nature of cabinet 
seats they were being offered). 
Meanwhile, in early August, the 
18th-century National Assembly 
building and two government min­
istries mysteriously burned to the 
ground. (There is a tradition of 
political arson in Suriname.)
The five VHP 2000 parliamentari­
ans left the Front, the equivalent of 
a political gaping chest wound. Yet 
even more damage was inflicted in 
late August. Willie Soemita, who 
always made sure his Javanese KTPI 
was in government, was lured away 
by the NDP and bolted from the 
Front with his five seats. The NDP 
and its allies now controlled 26 seats 
with the brain-dead Front holding 
only 14 seats. Even if the Front 
could hang onto the “middle block” 
and their eight seats, the Front 
would have controlled only a minori­
ty 22 seats to the NDP’s 26. With 
support from two of Alliantie’s three 
seats, the NDP coalition num bered a 
steamroller 28. The NDP could 
then form a government and, with 
this m om entum, could surely have 
swayed the Peoples’ Representatives 
Committees to vote their man, Jules 
Wijdenbosch, to the Presidency.
This development would have 
pleased Desi Bouterse.
On September 5, 1996, the assem­
bled United Peoples’ Committees 
voted 438 to 407 in favor of Jules 
Wijdenbosch as President of 
Suriname. Pretap Rhadakishun, 
favorite of the breakaway VHP 2000 
block, was elected Vice President. 
The old New Front is dead and poli­
tics as we know it in Suriname has 
been transformed. The question is, 
will the NDP resort to its authoritari­
an traditions of the 1980s or will the 
young ideologues of the “new poli­
tics” prevail. My money is on the 
form er scenario. ■
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Southeast Museum 
of Photography
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the Caribbean iff the World
P r o g r a m  S c h e d u l e
S p r i n g  1997 E x h i b i t i o n s —February  7-May 23, 1997
Archives and  Archetypes: Photographs by Barbara N orfleet 
A career retrospective by an artist n o ted  for bo th  docum en­
tary and  constructed  images.
Lotte Jacobi: Artist and  M entor
A survey o f the artist’s vast portfolio  which spanned  m ore 
than  50 years.
Jazz! Portraits o f Black M usicians by David Spitzer 
A tribute to jazz greats by a Florida photographer.
Security Envelope Grid: Cindy B ernard  
A conceptual work using pho tographs o f everyday patterns 
to construct a site-specific installation.
Recent Accessions: T he M exican Portfolio 
Photographs from  the M useum ’s p e rm an en t collection.
S u m m e r  1997 E x h i b i t i o n s — J u n e  17-Septem ber 19, 1997
To the Dogs: Photographs by Elliot Erwitt
Telling O ur Own Stories: F lorida’s Family Photographs
Some People: Peter Foe
Some Things: T orben Eskerod, Clint Im boden, A belardo 
M orrell, Veselovsky Pitts
S o u t h e a s t  M u s e u m  o f  P h o t o g r a p h y
1200 West International Speedway Boulevard, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
Museum Hours: Tuesady - Friday: 10-3, Tuesday: 5-7, Saturday & Sunday: 1-4 
Admission is always free. For m ore inform ation call: (904) 254-4475
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Unwanted Fame
Joseph  Rogers
W
hile President 
Leonel
Fernandez has 
committed his 
new administra­
tion to an agen­
da to consolidate democracy and 
provide economic opportunities in 
the Dominican Republic, another 
potentially corrosive process is 
underway in this country. In Santo 
Dom ingo’s halls of power and acad­
emic circles, the prospect of a new 
political and economic era is dis­
cussed with excitem ent and antici­
pation. Not discussed, however, is 
the ongoing problem  of narcotics 
trafficking and the consolidation of 
power by Dominican drug traffick­
ing organizations. The Dominican 
Republic is now considered by the 
US DEA the command, control, and 
communications center for 
Caribbean drug trafficking activi­
ties. Dominican organizations over­
see and m onitor most of the logisti­
cal requirem ents to move cocaine: 
aircraft, boats, global positioning 
systems for transportation, and 
radios and cellular phones for com­
munications and m anagem ent of 
organizations that stretch from New 
York to Colombia. The consolida­
tion of power by Dominican nar­
cotics trafficking organizations has 
the potential to underm ine the 
Fernandez agenda.
The Dominican Republic has 
been a key transshipm ent point for 
illicit narcotics throughout the
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1990s. A num ber of factors con­
tribute to this phenom enon. The 
most im portant is the close link 
between the Dominican Republic 
and New York, where most of the 
cocaine, and recently Colombian 
heroin, is destined. Dominicans 
have become an im portant force in 
New York’s political and economic 
life, with over an estimated 500,000 
residents.
T h e  S a n  Fr a n c is c o  C o n n e c t io n
The Dominican Republic lies mid­
way between the U nited States and 
Colombia, the source of most of the 
cocaine consum ed in the US. 
Dominican traffickers share a lan­
guage and cultural legacy with their 
Colombian partners. In recent 
years, they have developed close ties 
at the production, transportation, 
and distribution points of the 
cocaine trade. Furtherm ore, they 
have been able to exploit well-devel- 
oped family and business ties in 
New York. Consequently, Domini­
can traffickers have become prom i­
nent players in the US cocaine 
trade.
At hom e, a long history of 
Machiavellian ploys and political 
corruption has encouraged behav­
ior that further facilitates Domini­
can participation in the drug trade. 
A prom inent Dominican counter­
drug official traces the origins of 
the Dominican drug trade to 
groups that were exiled by President 
Joaquin Balaguer in 1965. This offi­
cial points to a group from San 
Francisco de Macoris as the most 
notable example. This region has a 
long history of resistance against 
authority and familiarity with arms. 
The San Francisco group developed 
an “ends justify the m eans” ideolo­
gy, and once exiled, sought funds to 
overthrow the Balaguer govern­
ment. One way the group obtained 
funds was by forming a drug traf­
ficking “cartel.” Today, many 
Dominican traffickers hail from San 
Francisco de Macoris.
In addition, some judges, politi­
cians, and law enforcem ent person­
nel can be bought for the right 
price. The low wages of public ser­
vants in the Dominican Republic 
allow the traffickers to buy the ser­
vices of these bureaucrats at a rela­
tively low cost. The inability of 
these institutions to pursue, prose­
cute, and punish traffickers is 
another structural feature encour­
aging Dominicans to participate in 
the lucrative drug trade.
Dominican drug trafficking orga­
nizations have evolved since the for­
mation of the San Francisco Cartel 
in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the 
Colombians developed trust in 
Dominican traffickers as a group 
that could effectively move and dis­
tribute Colombian cocaine—while 
remitting the proceeds. In fact, 
Dominicans m odeled their drug 
trafficking “style” after the 
Colombians, becoming m ore and 
m ore sophisticated with time. As 
the Dominicans achieved success in 
running  drug trafficking enterpris­
es, they displaced the formidable 
Jam aican “posses” in New York. 
Underlying the Dominicans’ success 
was a willingness to use violence to 
protect their drug trafficking “turf” 
and product.
By the 1990s, Dominican drug 
traffickers had moved into other 
cities where large num bers of 
Dominicans resided. Today, 
Dominicans control distribution 
centers around Boston and
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Dominican Republic—headquarters for narcotraffickers
The Dominican Republic is now considered by the US DEA 
the command, control, and communications center for 
Caribbean drug trafficking activities.
Baltimore and provide other traf­
ficking groups with cocaine in 
Washington, D.C., Richmond, and 
o ther East Coast cities. In 1993, a 
US congressional report called the 
Dominicans the second largest 
cocaine distributors on the East 
Coast, after the Colombians.
C o m m a n d  a n d  C o n t r o l
Meanwhile, Dominican traffickers 
were perfecting their craft at home. 
Dominicans had long been involved 
in smuggling illegal aliens across 
the Mona Channel, in small craft 
called yolas, to Puerto Rico. Soon 
drugs were included in these trips, 
proceeding to New York and else­
where without passing through 
Customs. In addition, large num ­
bers of legal and illegal Dominicans 
rem ained in Puerto Rico, further 
strengthening this link in the 
cocaine trafficking chain.
U nited States counterdrug poli­
cies further propelled Dominican 
groups toward the pinnacle of the 
drug trafficking world. When 
President Clinton took office in 
1993, he announced a “controlled 
shift” to transfer technical assets 
from the “transit zone” in the 
Caribbean to the Andean supply 
countries of Colombia, Bolivia and 
Peru. Two radar sites in the 
Dominican Republic were removed, 
leaving US and Dominican counter­
drug forces with an inability to 
detect aircraft below 5,000 feet. As 
a result, traffickers renewed the 
practice of the 1980s to drop loads 
after flying over Dominican air­
space. Technology plays a key role 
as m ore sophisticated radios, cellu­
lar phones and global positioning 
systems are used by traffickers. 
Dominican trafficking groups have
used these com m unication modes 
along their east coast, where drugs 
can be moved directly to Puerto 
Rico, and increasingly in a m oun­
tainous corridor between Bani and 
Barahona, northward to Puerto 
Plata. Aircraft have become too 
valuable an asset for pilots to land 
and risk detection, arrest and 
seizure of planes.
F ree T r a d e  a n d  D r u g s
One of the most notable features 
about Dominican drug trafficking 
organizations is their flexibility, fust 
as law enforcem ent officials were 
starting to understand these activi­
ties, trafficking groups changed 
their modus operandi. A recent shift 
in the traffickers' strategy may be 
the most difficult for the 
Dominican government and the US 
DEA to counter: the use of cargo 
containers and free trade zones. 
These zones may ensure that most 
of the goods that leave the 
Dominican Republic do so without 
inspection. According to US DEA, 
with one customs inspector for 
every 15 or 20 companies, 
Dominican traffickers have allegedly 
resorted to placing some of their 
cocaine in cargo containers bound 
for the US, with little risk of detec­
tion. If this trend continues, traf­
fickers will be able to com partm en­
talize their operations, leaving one 
person responsible for the trans­
portation part of the operation, 
without a direct link to those ulti­
mately receiving the cocaine. The 
use of the free zones is especially 
worrisome because one of the pil­
lars of President Fernandez’s eco­
nomic reform  program  is expand­
ing the free trade zones and 
increasing unfettered commerce.
T h e  Ea st e r n  Ca r ib b e a n  
Dominican drug trafficking orga­
nizations have used their expertise 
to control the cocaine trade in New 
York, Puerto Rico, and now, St. 
M aarten and St. Kitts. Dominican 
groups began using these eastern 
Caribbean islands to avoid detec­
tion. In this region, they employ 
m ethods similar to those used in 
smuggling aliens and drugs across 
the Mona Channel, and move the 
cocaine through Puerto Rico to 
New York. Dominicans have 
expanded these operations to o ther 
islands and now control most of the 
cocaine traffic in the Caribbean.
M o d e r n -D ay D is t in c t io n
If the trends highlighted above 
are correct, the Dominican 
Republic has earned the label of 
command, control and communica­
tions center of Caribbean drug traf­
ficking. From the Dominican 
Republic, 15 major trafficking 
organizations control the movement 
of drugs across the Caribbean to 
the continental United States.
These groups have become so pro­
ficient at moving cocaine through 
the Caribbean, that in some opera-
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tions, Colombians may actually work 
for the Dominicans. Furtherm ore, 
according to New York narcotics 
officers, some New York-based 
Dominican groups have gone 
directly to Colombia to negotiate 
prices and arrange transportation. 
The Dominicans also retain respon­
sibility for the distribution of drugs 
in New York’s Washington Heights. 
The execution of these tasks 
requires the use of sophisticated 
communications and m anagem ent 
techniques. The compartmentaliza- 
tion of operations is a popular way 
of ensuring that the organization 
becomes less vulnerable to disman­
tling. In short, Dominicans have 
become a major cocaine trafficking 
group in the United States.
U nited States counterdrug offi­
cials have apparently recognized 
this trend and have committed the 
same type of sophisticated electron­
ic intelligence gathering equipm ent 
used in Colombia to the Dominican 
Republic. Seizures have risen in the 
last three fiscal years, from 2,000 
kilos in 1993 to over 4,000 in 1996. 
However, the exact am ount of 
cocaine transiting through the 
Dominican Republic remains 
unclear. The increase may reflect 
better reporting techniques rather 
than a net increase in trafficking.
In many ways, President 
Fernandez and his group of advisors 
find themselves between the prover­
bial rock and a hard place. To 
deliver on the promise of opening 
the political and economic process­
es in the Dominican Republic, 
President Fernandez must pursue 
policies that encourage greater 
trade and safeguard the rights of all 
Dominicans. The process of dem o­
cratic consolidation is daunting in 
the best of circumstances. With 
increasingly powerful drug traffick­
ing organizations in the Dominican 
Republic, President Fernandez 
could face challenges similar to 
those that underm ine Colombian 
democracy. ■
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BUSINESS REPORTS -  UPCOMING
Customs Guide to the Americas 1997
This update from last year's Guide includes a special 
section geared to the state of Florida. The Guide is 
intended to give the user an overview of customs proce­
dures—not regulations. An introductory matrix outlining 
trade agreements and participating countries is useful 
for traders and the business community in general.
Chile: A Hemispheric Force
Chile's economy, trade patterns, and policies are exam­
ined in this report. The primary purpose is to provide 
information and analysis that will allow the private sec­
tor to identify potential opportunities and challenges 
presented by Chile's growing role in the global econo­
my. The potential impacts that Chile's accession to 
NAFTA would have on the U.S. and Florida are also 
identified in a nonquantitative manner.
Annual Report on Trade 1996/1997
For the trader, strategist, and economic development 
community, this Annual Report presents analyses of 
three- to five-year trends in merchandise trade among 
the U.S., Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Growth commodities and Florida's competitive regions 
in the U.S. are also identified.
Brazil-Florida: Commercial Connections
Brazil's economy is the world's tenth largest and by far 
the biggest in Latin America. Political and economic 
data are analyzed, including Brazil's new economic 
recovery plan and its new currency, the real. 
Privatization and liberalization regimes are examined 
over the past five years.
MERCOSUR-Florida Relations
The second largest trading bloc within the Americas, 
MERCOSUR is an enigma to many businesses. This 
report examines MERCOSUR with an eye to under­
standing its business climate, and is directed to business 
and industry executives.
Summit of the Americas Center
F L O R I D A  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  U N I V E R S I T Y
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T he  G lo b a l  M a n a g e r  P r o g r a m
C e n t e r  f o r  I n t e r n a t io n a l  E x e c u t iv e  E d u c a t io n
C o l l e g e  o f  B u s in e s s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
F l o r id a  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U n iv e r s it y
T he G lobal M anager Program , offered by Florida International University’s C enter for International Executive Education, is an 
intensive developm ent program  designed to  prepare executives for the responsibilities and opportunities o f  m anagem ent in the 
new  m illennium . Participants from U.S. and foreign businesses are brought together to explore the potential o f the global busi­
ness arena and develop the competencies necessary to m eet emerging challenges. T hrough  a com bination o f  lectures, case stud ­
ies, and small group learning exercises, the program participants reevaluate old ideas, explore new ones, and form ulate strategic 
plans for their individual enterprises.
P R O G R A M  D E S C R I P T I O N
The program is organized around three one-week modules. 
Each o f the week-long modules emphasizes a different dim en­
sion o f management in the dynamic international arena. The 
physical locations for each module are chosen to reinforce the 
core learning concepts.
M odule I -  U pdating and Integrating the Fundamentals: 
S trengthening  C ore Functional C om petencies and 
D eveloping M ultifunctional Integrative Skills. D uring this 
week, participants are familiarized w ith the latest knowledge 
and advances in the fundam ental functional areas o f  market­
ing, finance, inform ation systems, organization theory, hum an 
resource management, and strategic management.
M odule II -  Developing Team and Leadership Skills in a 
M ulticultural Business Environm ent. T he focus o f the second 
module is on the development o f the skills and competencies 
necessary to be an adaptable, flexible, and responsive manager 
in an uncertain global business environment characterized by 
complexity and diversity.
M odule III -  M anaging the Challenges o f  a G lobal 
Competitiveness. D uring the final module, participants exam­
ine the challenges to organizations competing in an evolving 
global environment. Emerging trends such as the “virtual cor­
poration” and the “boundariless organization” are evaluated as 
potential responses to the transformation o f  business in the eco­
nomic arena. Further, participants are exposed to issues relating 
the organization to the broader economic, social, and legal envi­
ronments. Topics such as the dynamics o f business-government 
interaction, the impact o f international laws on inter-company 
alliances, and the role o f ethics in a contemporary society are 
explored.
W H O  S H O U L D  A T T E N D ?
Program participants should:
• have attained or be on track to attain a position in general 
management or be a functional division head w ith strategic 
management responsibilities;
• be from an organization that is currently international or 
has the desire to become a player in the international busi­
ness arena;
• have a minim um  of five (5) years o f managerial experience;
• hold responsibility for activities that are impacted by inter­
national competitive forces; and
• have the strong support o f a sponsoring institution.
F O R  M O R E  IN F O R M A T I O N
To receive more information about the Global Manager 
Program, please contact:
Center for International Executive Education 
College o f Business Administration 
Florida International University 
University Park, Miami, Florida 33199, USA 
Telephone: (305) 348-3279 
Fax: (305) 348-2368 
E-mail: CIEE@ FIU.EDU 
Internet: http://www.fiu.edu/CIEE
Features: The Caribbean
The European Connection
P eter  A . Penfold
T
o the Latin American 
drug trafficker, the 
Caribbean represents 
just one entity through 
which the merchandise 
can pass to reach the 
lucrative markets of the United 
States and Europe. The drug traf­
ficker ignores—but at the same 
time exploits—the region's territor­
ial boundaries and national differ­
ences. By using various routes 
through different Caribbean coun­
tries, the drug trafficker spreads the 
risk of detection. Meanwhile, due 
to the local spillover effect of the 
drug trade, the drug trafficker also 
spreads more widely throughout 
the region the problem s associated 
with drugs.
The view held by most Caribbean 
states in the past was that d rug traf­
ficking was not their problem —it 
was a problem  for the Latin 
American producer countries and 
the N orth American and European 
consum er countries. They, the 
Caribbean countries, just happened 
to be on the route through which 
the drugs passed. The traffickers, 
though, began to pay those who 
helped the flow of drugs through 
the Caribbean in kind as well as in 
cash; a local dem and was created, 
drug abuse and drug-related crime 
increased, and governments came 
to realize that d rug trafficking was
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in fact a problem . Some countries, 
often with outside assistance partic­
ularly from the U nited States and 
Britain, took measures to counter 
the flow of drugs. The traffickers, 
however, continued to exploit the 
weakest links in the chain of efforts 
to curtail the trade, whilst many of 
the small island states continued to 
tu rn  a blind eye, either to benefit 
from the boost to their economies 
from the injection of drug money, 
or because they felt powerless to act 
individually against the vast re­
sources available to the drug traf­
fickers.
Attempts by the countries of the 
Caribbean to come together and to 
cooperate m ore closely have gener­
ally met limited success—even with 
com m on language groups. Cross­
language cooperation (e.g., 
English/Spanish) has been virtually 
nonexistent. A regional approach 
offers the only effective way to fight 
the drug problem  in the Caribbean. 
The region abounds with regional 
organizations, but apart from odd 
exceptions such as the West Indies 
cricket team and the University of 
the West Indies, few have been 
m uch m ore than fora for m eeting 
and talking.
E u r o p e a n  U n io n  I n it ia t iv e
In April 1996, a team of eight 
European Union (EU) Drug 
experts produced a report which 
form ed the basis for the Plan of 
Action adopted at a m eeting orga­
nized by the U nited Nations Drug 
Control Program (UNDCP) and 
hosted by Barbados in May 1996. 
Over 250 delegates from every 
Caribbean country attended, along­
side delegations from North 
America and Europe. For the first
time, the nations of the Caribbean 
adopted a raft of practical proposals 
to strengthen the regional effort 
against the drug problem . The 
Plan of Action was an encouraging 
step to turn  the tide against the 
flow of drugs.
The European Union team was 
com prised of experts from Britain, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain, 
countries with the closest tradition­
al links with the Caribbean. This 
team ’s collective antidrug experi­
ence covered all aspects of the drug 
problem , from police and customs 
interdiction, prosecution and 
money laundering, to dem and 
reduction and rehabilitation. The 
EU team included a French profes­
sor of toxicology, a Dutch prosecu­
tor, a Spanish police officer, and a 
form er governor of a British 
Caribbean territory. The team ’s 
coordinator, representing the 
European Commission, had been 
the UNDCP’s representative in the 
region for the previous three years. 
This range of interests and exper­
tise gave the team unprecedented 
access and cooperation from all the 
countries of the region.
G a ps  a n d  W e a k n esses  
As m andated by the European 
heads of governm ent—on the ini­
tiative of British Prime Minister 
John  Major and French President 
Jacques Chirac— the team brought 
to the forefront a num ber of signifi­
cant gaps and weaknesses in the 
regional effort to com bat the drug 
problem , and made specific practi­
cal proposals on how to fill these 
gaps and overcome these weakness­
es. The team noted, for example, 
that in spite of a plethora of intelli­
gence gathering systems operating
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As one reformed addict in the Turks and Caicos Islands 
told members of the EU team, “the message against drugs 
has to be as powerful as the drugs themselves. ”
th roughout the region, it was still 
not possible for every single coun­
try to be able to pass drug-related 
intelligence inform ation directly, 
quickly, and securely to any other 
to u n try  in the region. This draw­
back was highlighted when, in the 
absence of such a com munications 
network, m em bers of the team had 
to facilitate a link between Jamaica 
and Curasao. Also with regard to 
law enforcem ent/in terd iction  mea­
sures—and recognizing that, in 
essence, the Caribbean is a sea mass 
over or through which most of the 
drugs transit—the EU team advo­
cated the establishm ent of subre­
gional coast guards, tasked and 
equipped to strengthen the m ar­
itime effort against d rug trafficking.
In e ffe c t iv e  I m p l e m e n t a t io n
The different legal jurisdictions 
which operate in the Caribbean, 
based upon English, French, Dutch, 
and Spanish systems, m ean that uni­
formity of legislation is not a reality, 
but, as is shown within the 
European Union itself, there is 
m uch scope for closer harm oniza­
tion of antidrug legislation. 
Consequently, bilateral and multi­
lateral treaties and agreem ents on 
antidrug cooperation can be nego­
tiated.
The EU team found inadequate 
the im plem entation of the legisla­
tion. All loo often drug offenders 
fail to get convicted in Caribbean 
courts through weaknesses in judi­
cial prosecution. When a drug traf­
ficker is caught in a Caribbean 
country, a highly paid and experi­
enced lawyer appears on the island 
to defend the trafficker. Such 
lawyers are able to move from one 
jurisdiction to another without any
difficulty, and have acquired a 
degree of expertise in drug-related 
cases. Often these lawyers are too 
well m atched against the over­
worked and underpaid  prosecuting 
counsels of governments. The EU 
experts proposed developing a 
regional cadre of experienced drug 
prosecutors who could be made 
available to assist any Caribbean 
country.
P r e c u r so r s  a n d  E ssentia l  C hem icals
The Caribbean is particularly vul­
nerable to the illegal transit of pre­
cursors and essential chemicals, 
which convert coca leaf into 
cocaine. Yet, the EU team found 
that virtually nothing is being done 
to establish effective control mecha­
nisms. Legitimate use of precursors 
and essential chemicals must be 
strictly m onitored and enforced. A 
company which manufactures 
paint, for example, requires ace­
tone to dilute color pigments when 
producing its products. If the 
national authorities do not know 
the exact am ount of acetone 
required by the m anufacturer for 
legitimate use, then how can they 
control the im portation of the legit­
imately required quantities? There 
is another problem  over re-invoic- 
ing, a common practice in the 
im p o rt/ex p o rt business. Precursors 
and essential chemicals, normally 
shipped by sea, are described and 
quantified on the original shipping 
manifests and invoices at the port
of loading. However, these can be 
modified or changed once the ves­
sel is at sea. The vessel may also 
then head to a different destina­
tion, with a “m odified” cargo under 
a different description and with 
revised quantities. LInless the origi­
nal manifest and invoices are for­
warded by Customs at the port of 
loading to Customs at the po rt of 
discharge, then no effective control 
is possible.
In the Caribbean, responsibility 
for the control of precursors and 
essential chemicals is usually given 
to ministries of health or industry, 
which rarely have the necessary 
investigative or enforcem ent powers 
to control movement of these prod­
ucts. The N etherlands Antilles is 
the sole exception where local legis­
lation has been enacted with ade­
quate control powers entrusted to 
relevant official bodies.
L in k s  w it h  L a t in  A m er ic a  
Given that the source of most of 
the Caribbean’s serious drug prob­
lem is Latin America, the EU team 
found it surprising that there are 
virtually no links between the two 
regions to com bat the drug prob­
lem. The team proposed ihe estab­
lishment of Drug Liaison Officer 
posts m anned by Caribbean officials 
in key Latin American countries 
such as Colombia and Venezuela.
To be really effective, such officers 
would need to act on behalf of all 
Caribbean countries. A closer coor­
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dination of Caribbean law enforce­
m ent effort would be required.
T h e  G anja  D ilem m a
It is impossible to address the 
drug problems of the Caribbean 
without addressing the marijuana 
or ganja problem. Ganja is the 
most widely abused drug in the 
Caribbean and the only one that is 
locally grown and produced 
(although there are reports of pop­
pies being grown in rem ote areas of 
Belize and Guyana). Ganja abuse 
reportedly dates back to the intro­
duction of indentured workers 
from India following the abolition 
of slavery. The word ganja is itself a 
H indu word. The drug has 
acquired an accepted socioreligious 
use throughout the region, prim ari­
ly connected with the Rastafarians, 
the socioreligious sect identified 
with the late Ethiopian em peror 
Haile Selassie, also known as Ras 
Teferi. However, not only Rastas 
use ganja.
The EU experts’ report discarded 
the myth that m arijuana is not 
harmful, or at least, less harmful 
than, for example, alcohol or tobac­
co. Medical opinion shows that one 
cannot generalize the effects of 
marijuana. These depend upon the 
toxicity, which can vary greatly 
depending upon the concentration 
of THC. The health risks of m ari­
juana, however, should not be 
ignored. Drug rehabilitation cen­
ters in Jam aica are constantly deal­
ing with the problem  of marijuana 
abuse; for many addicts, m arijuana 
has been the “gateway” drug to 
m ore harmful ones (such as 
cocaine and heroin). In light of 
presentations made by Caribbean 
Commissioners of Police and others 
who decry having to tie up large 
num bers of their forces on the 
eradication of cannabis, the team, 
somewhat controversially, support­
ed the view that the eradication of 
ganja and the arrest for simple pos­
session should be given a lower pri­
ority within law enforcem ent 
efforts. The EU team also support­
ed a call for a study on alternatives 
for dealing with the problem s of 
the growing and smoking of ganja.
D em a n d  R e d u c t io n / R eh a bilita tio n
Most people in the Caribbean do 
not associate m arijuana with the 
evils of o ther drugs; dem and reduc­
tion /pub lic  education programs are 
underm ined  because of this lack of 
association. Although every gov­
ernm ent has some form  of public 
inform ation campaign against 
drugs, the message is no t getting 
through, especially to the youth in 
the communities. As one reform ed 
addict in the Turks and Caicos 
Islands told m embers of the EU 
team, “the message against drugs 
has to be as powerful as the drugs 
themselves.” The EU team advocat­
ed stronger, m ore targeted cam­
paigns—merely copying the mes­
sages given in N orth American and 
European countries is not the 
answer. Each Caribbean country 
must devise its own campaign, 
learning from the experience of 
others, but taking into account its 
own cultural and sociological iden­
tities. The practice of attributing 
the street value when publicizing 
drug seizures and confiscations 
does not help. The fact that x 
am ount of drugs has street value of 
y millions of dollars may actually 
encourage the young to engage in 
drug trafficking. The real value of 
seized and confiscated drugs is the 
potential num ber of lives that may 
have been saved, and the num ber 
of families which may have been 
spared misery, deprivation and 
hardship.
Rehabilitating drug offenders is a 
worthwhile but expensive and time- 
consuming task. This activity lends 
itself to closer regional collabora­
tion. The EU team recom m ended 
the establishment, throughout the 
region, of a network of residential 
rehabilitation/detoxification cen­
ters m odeled on facilities such as 
Sandilands in the Bahamas. These 
facilities should com plem ent the 
necessary outpatient centers on 
every island. The team also noted 
the need to rehabilitate drug 
offenders in prison. O ther than in 
Cuba, the majority of inmates in 
Caribbean prisons are on drug con­
victions. Sadly, many young offend­
ers im prisoned for simple posses­
sion em erge (after six m onths of 
incarceration in cram ped cells with 
drug traffickers) more prone to fol­
low a life of drugs and crime.
At the end of the day, rehabilita­
tion or interdiction efforts, however 
seemingly successful, will merely 
curb or contain the drug problem. 
To make a serious impact, one must 
reduce the dem and. All govern­
m ent representatives who collabo­
rated with the EU team claimed 
that d rug dem and reduction com­
m anded a high priority in their gov­
ernm ent programs. However, when 
asked what percentage of govern­
m ent revenue was actually chan­
neled towards dem and reduction 
programs, the answers were invari­
ably disappointing.
A t  Stake
The drug problem  is no t merely 
one of law enforcem ent or health. 
The problem s associated with 
drugs and drug trafficking repre­
sent the greatest threat to the sta­
bility and developm ent of the 
Caribbean. These problem s are 
now underm ining  democracy in 
the region. Drugs feed corruption, 
and corruption  is voracious. Drug 
money can buy governm ents and 
finance political parties. The cor­
ruption  from drugs eats away at the 
fabric of societies until the dem oc­
ratic institutions needed to sustain 
democracy collapse. Caribbean 
democracy is u nder th reat from the 
onslaught of the drug menace.
The region needs to come togeth­
er, as never before, to fight the 
d rug  problem . ■
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environmental solutions for the world
The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET)
would like to announce the formation of their partnership
HCET's vision is to become a model-bridging institute in the Western Hemisphere 
for diffusing environmental technologies that promote mutual economic 
benefit and sustainable development in the United States and the Americas.
HCET's mission is to develop and market technologies for 
solving environmental problems throughout the Americas.
HCET encourages the development and use of sustainable technologies as a 
means of preserving the environment while fostering economic development.
HCET offers the following benefits to partners 
in the U.S., Latin America, and the Caribbean:
• Science and engineering capabilities 
• Cost-effective technology development 
•  Technology assessment 
•  Access to markets and technology resources
For more information, con tac t:
M.  Ebadian, Ph.D. 
Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology
Voice (305) 348-4238/FAX (305) 348 -4 17 6  
E-mail: ebadian@ eng.fiu .edu 
World Wide Web Site: h ttp ://w w w .fiu.edu/~hcet ° o U
S P E C I A L  
A Photographic Retrospective
J
ames Nelson Goodsell 
passed away in January  
1996, leaving behind  a 
legacy of thirty years of 
coverage of Latin Ameri­
ca and the Caribbean for 
the Christian Science 
Monitor. Those who knew 
his work and his character rem em ­
ber Goodsell’s unselfish nature. He 
shared his knowledge and experi­
ence with num erous reporters who 
covered the region with him. His 
readers and viewers will always 
rem em ber his insightful columns 
and probing interviews. In the 
final phase of his life, Jim  shared 
his wisdom with students at the
University of Miami and with col­
leagues from the Miami Herald and 
Florida In ternational University.
In death, the legacy o f his work 
continues to enlighten all who 
share a passion for the region. 
Thanks to J im ’s widow, Rhoda 
“Missy” Ford, Hemisphere is able to 
share with its readers a small selec­
tion of thousands of photographs 
taken by Goodsell in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. The Goodsell collec­
tion includes audio and video 
tapes, transcripts of interviews, 
thousands of slides, and other 
m aterial that docum ents four 
decades of Latin American and 
Caribbean history. In addition to
the photographs reproduced here, 
for example, the collection in­
cludes Goodsell’s interviews with 
Sandinista leaders, the Contra 
opposition, and others involved in 
the Central American conflict of 
the 1980s.
The collection is available for 
viewing at Florida International 
University’s library. The pictures 
reproduced here are also part o f a 
digital library available on the Latin 
American and Caribbean Center 
web site (http://www .fiu.edu/~lacc). 
The Goodsell collection will ensure 
that J im ’s work will continue to 
inspire journalists, academics and 
students. ■
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From the archives of the late James Nelson Goodsell
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Linden Forbes Burnham, form er prim e minister o f Guyana and  
Cheddi Jagan ’s form er ally from the People's Progressive Party.
48 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
Special Feature: Goodsell
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
Special Feature: Goodsell
50 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
Special Feature: Goodsell
Hemisphere  •  Volume Seven, Num ber Three 51
Special Feature: Goodsell
52 H em isphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
Special Feature: Goodsell
A “young” Joaquin Balaguer gives a press confer­
ence shortly after being elected president in 1966.
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Symbols of different times. Chilean president Salvador 
Allende— a few  years before h is assassination in a coup—  
and Fidel Castro are greeted by a Chilean crowd, 1971.
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Leviathan and Lilliputians
J o rg e  R odrigu ez B e ru ff
The United States and 
the Caribbean
by Anthony P. Maingot,
Boidder: Westview Press, 1994.
Caribbean Maritime Security
by Michael A. Morris,
London: Macmillan, 1994.
he works under review 
bring a new perspective 
to the analysis of the 
relations between the 
hem isphere’s Leviathan 
and Lilliputians. At 
first glance, The United States and the 
Caribbean appears written for the US 
academic m arket and can serve as a 
text for courses on the Caribbean; 
this book can also be considered a 
worthwhile contem porary source 
for policy makers interested in the 
region. A closer examination, how­
ever, reveals the book’s more essen­
tial character. The United States and 
the Caribbean contributes to the 
Caribbean political and intellectual 
debate on the most effective 
approach that Caribbean leaders 
should take, given the huge asym­
metries of power and geopolitical 
reality of existing within the US 
“sphere of influence.” Anthony 
Maingot consciously places his views 
within a historically defined “cen­
trist” position. According to 
Maingot, the region’s approach to 
the US should fall halfway between 
the polar response of total sub­
servience and intransigent con­
frontation. Hence, he dissents from
Jorge Rodriguez Beruff is professor of 
Political Science at the University of 
Puerto-Rio Piedras.
the (allegedly) radical anti-imperial­
ist stance of one of his intellectual 
mentors, Gordon Lewis.
Maingot stresses that from a 
Caribbean viewpoint, negotiation 
with the US based on common 
goals is the only viable approach. 
Currently, the common goals can 
be described as the struggle against 
drugs and its spinoff of corruption 
and money laundering, regional 
security, the prom otion of dem ocra­
tic institutions and, what he calls 
the “synergies” of the US-Caribbean 
relationship: cultural links and 
trade.
T hroughout the book, Maingot 
offers examples of successful 
attempts at negotiation by 
Caribbean leaders—even at the 
height of the Cold War—and 
underscores the many failures of 
leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of 
Guyana, Michael Manley of Jamaica, 
and Maurice Bishop of Grenada. 
Wily Eric Williams of Trinidad and 
Tobago is seen as a Caribbean 
politician who knew how to maxi­
mize his maneuverability while not 
openly breaking with the US. 
Maingot also describes with great 
relish Williams’s twists and turns in 
playing the “Cuba card.” More 
broadly, M aingot’s sympathies lie 
with the postwar generation of 
reformist political leaders known as 
the izquierda democratica, which 
included Jose Figueres, Luis Munoz 
Marin, Romulo Gallegos, and 
Romulo Betancourt.
According to Maingot, national­
ism and radical anti-imperialism, 
grounded on historical grievances, 
have been obstacles in dealing with 
the US. Maingot argues that “some 
of the more enduring attitudes and 
perceptions have to do with symbol­
ic, not material grievances or satis­
factions.” The author associates 
these ideological trends to what he 
calls “state-centric” conceptions of 
sovereignty. Consequently, he raises 
the issue of the m eaning of sover­
eignty in the Caribbean. Maingot 
believes that sovereignty should not 
be considered the static and 
absolute “state of grace” of the 
Grotian tradition, but a dynamic 
concept intrinsically related to the 
dem ocratic expression of the inter­
ests of the populations of Caribbean 
societies. Sovereignty, therefore, 
should be exercised within the con­
fines of the region’s relationship of 
“complex in terdependence” with 
the US. Consequently, the author 
pays m uch attention to the polar 
cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico.
Regarding the structure of the 
book, the first three chapters trace, 
in broad outline, the historical 
developm ent of US-Caribbean rela­
tions from the 19th century 
through World War II. In his 
account of the historical roots of 
the US-Caribbean relations,
Maingot equivocally asserts that 
these roots have been grounded, 
from the US vantage point, in 
geopolitical and security considera­
tions. In the introduction, he states, 
“if one were to choose a single word 
to encapsulate Caribbean history, 
that word would have to be ‘geopol­
itics,’ the relationship between 
geography and international rela­
tions.”
M aingot’s conception of geopoli­
tics, however, precludes any consid­
eration of the interplay am ong eco­
nomic, military, and political inter­
ests during the period he discusses. 
In fact, the author dismisses the 
im portance of economic factors.
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Geoeconomics is excluded as an 
im portant com ponent of geopoli­
tics. Nevertheless, the discussion of 
current trends, challenges, and 
threats to the region focuses on 
such issues as migration and the 
internationalization of crime, which 
clearly have economic implications.
The first two chapters deal with 
US interventionism  up to 1935. The 
most interesting contribution of 
these chapters is the perceptive 
observation of the lasting im print 
left in the regional collective memo­
ry by the arrogant and racist atti­
tudes displayed by the US. The 
third chapter, the most original and 
interesting in this part of the work, 
discusses strategic military develop­
ments during World War II, particu­
larly the decisive impact of the 
“Battle of the C aribbean” waged 
against the German submarine 
offensive. The consideration of two 
other aspects of the strategic situa­
tion, namely, the im portance 
attached to air war and the geopo­
litical role of Brazil p rior to 1941, 
would have strengthened Maingot's 
sharp analysis.
Part Two of the book includes 
three chapters on US “contain­
m ent” strategies in Central America 
and the Caribbean and the policies 
toward the English-speaking 
Caribbean during the Reagan era. 
Particularly interesting is chapter 4, 
which contrasts the outcomes of the 
political processes in Costa Rica and 
Guyana, as well as the prom inent 
role played by the CIA during this 
era. The author, however, did not 
dwell m uch on the 1965 US inva­
sion of the Dominican Republic, an 
event that perhaps did not fit well 
into the main thrust of his argu­
ment.
The concluding part of the book 
focuses on several dimensions of 
the contem porary regional situation 
that impinge on both US and 
Caribbean interests and create com­
mon basis for collaboration. These 
areas include the internationaliza­
tion of corruption and violence, the 
“offshore" developm ent strategy 
and its relationship to corruption 
and money laundering, migration, 
and the prom otion of democracy.
Part Three is another high point 
of the book. Chapters 8 and 9, in 
particular, are excellent, and make 
persuasive arguments about the 
magnitude of some of the threats 
posed to both the state and the pri­
vate sector. In short, M aingot’s book 
is a scholarly, well-written, con­
sciously polemical, and thought-pro­
voking contribution to Caribbean 
scholarship. The United States and the 
Caribbean should be read by 
Caribbean intellectuals and political 
leaders of all persuasions.
Although Michael Morris deals 
with a narrower topic than Maingot, 
in several ways Caribbean Maritime 
Security is related to M aingot’s work, 
notably to the pertinence of a 
geopolitical approach to interna­
tional relations in the Caribbean 
and the new challenges to regional 
security in the post-Cold War era. 
Unlike M aingot’s book, the work by 
Morris explores an aspect of the 
regional situation on which there is 
a glaring dearth of inform ation and 
research. Caribbean Maritime Security 
is therefore a unique contribution 
to the literature on regional security 
that should stimulate further 
research on naval and maritime 
issues.
Morris notes the apparent para­
dox represented by the evident
im portance o f the maritime 
dimension of Caribbean history, 
on the one hand, and the appar­
en t neglect of maritime policies 
by Caribbean states, on the other. 
This contradiction is of particular 
concern to the author as “...mar­
itime affairs and security promise 
to be central to the future of 
Caribbean states.” The im por­
tance of naval and maritime mat­
ters to the Caribbean has been 
enhanced by the expansion of 
national maritime zones brought 
about by the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, and by the dual chal­
lenges of seaborne illegal migra­
tion and the burgeoning drug 
trade. Naval policy in the 
Caribbean relates mainly to 
national coast guard capabilities, 
since only large states such as the 
United States have the capacity to 
project conventional naval power 
based on large navies. Thus, the 
book focuses mainly on coast 
guards and their “offshore 
enforcem ent” role.
In Chapter 2, the author pro­
vides a m uch needed overview of 
existing naval forces and capabili­
ties. In his typology, only 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico 
have offshore territorial defense 
capabilities. Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic are classified 
as having inshore territorial 
defense capabilities, and in both 
cases the tendency points toward 
a possible weakening of those 
capabilities. (The end of Soviet 
support is m entioned in the case 
of Cuba and the obsolescent 
equipm ent and budgetary con­
straints of the Dominican 
Republic is also discussed.) The 
rest of the naval forces of Central
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America and the Caribbean are clas­
sified as "token.” Morris also 
divides the regional coast guards 
into three groups: multimission, 
inshore, and port and harbor. This 
chapter also provides invaluable 
material on personnel, military 
expenditure, arms transfers, and US 
assistance.
The third chapter and an appen­
dix provide a general overview of 
the naval aspects of the Cold War in 
the Caribbean, analyzing the role of 
the US, the USSR, Cuba and other 
Caribbean states. The author 
argues that never throughout the 
Cold War, except during the Cuban 
missile crisis, did the sporadic and 
limited presence of the USSR (or 
the mainly defensive naval potential 
of Cuba) pose a major naval chal­
lenge to the US. M orris’s argum ent 
underscores how blown out of pro­
portion was Cuba’s “naval th rea t” 
during the heyday of the Cold War. 
Yet, missing from this chapter is a 
discussion of the US base system 
and the naval com m and structure 
relevant to the Caribbean.
In the next two chapters, Morris 
turns to more contem porary issues 
with evident maritime security impli­
cations: illegal immigration and 
drug trafficking. Concerning the 
former, he describes the maritime 
flows of emigrants from Cuba, Haiti, 
and the Dominican Republic to the 
US, and provides an appendix with 
a useful migration chronology. 
Morris suggests that a more restric­
tive US immigration policy, without 
major internal changes within 
Caribbean societies, will result in 
continued illegal migration flows.
In reference to drug trafficking, 
Morris emphasizes the importance 
of interdiction for both the US and 
Caribbean states. Despite some suc­
cesses in interdiction efforts, such as 
Operation Bahamas and the Turks 
and Caicos (OPBAT), the flow of 
drugs to the US continues, and new 
routes to Europe have emerged. A 
feature of this flow is the fluidity
and capacity of drug operators to 
shift routes. Thus, Morris is able to 
persuade us that drugs and migra­
tion will continue to engage the 
naval and coast guard capabilities of 
the US and regional states.
One of the many geostrategic 
issues discussed in Caribbean 
Maritime Security is that of Caribbean 
straits or Sea Lanes of Communica­
tion (SLOCs). According to the 
writer, 10 of the 26 strategically 
im portant straits are located in the 
Caribbean. Moreover, these straits 
played vital roles in the US-Soviet 
confrontation during the Cold War. 
With the end of the Cold War, the 
Caribbean straits lose im portance 
from a conventional military per­
spective, but they retain their rele­
vance as routes for illegal immigra­
tion and drug trafficking. This 
point is fu rther developed in chap­
ter 7. Morris believes that “with the 
decline of the Cold War, local secu­
rity issues have gained prom inence
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and the islands have greater leeway 
in dealing with them .” He suggests 
that besides challenges posed by 
drugs and migration, maritime 
boundary delimitation and ocean 
m anagem ent may have even greater 
maritime im portance for small 
Caribbean states. According to 
Morris, maritime policy is an area 
requiring increased international 
collaboration.
In sum, Caribbean Maritime Security 
is a required reading for scholars 
and policy makers interested in con­
tem porary issues of Caribbean 
international relations and security. 
This book represents the only com­
prehensive study on Caribbean 
naval capabilities and coast guard 
forces.
The United States and the Caribbean 
and Caribbean Maritime Security pro­
vide new and original approaches to 
studying regional problems, while 
suggesting im portant issues for 
future research and scholarship. ■
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